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INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have not yet been able to develop a uni-
fied standard for analyzing cooperative activity among competi-
tors. The courts' failure stems in part from the variety of ways
in which competitors can collaborate.1 Joint ventures can
range from mere contractual agreements among competitors to
arrangements that are nearly as integrated as mergers. Joint
ventures can also have divergent competitive purposes and ef-
fects. Some cooperative arrangements promote economic effi-
ciency while others merely facilitate collusion among
competitors. Joint ventures thus present the courts with a di-
lemma with which they have struggled since the passage of the
Sherman Act in 1890: how to distinguish "desirable cooperative
activity from undesirable cartel agreements."'2
In recent years, firms have formed joint ventures more
often for pro-competitive purposes than to restrict competition.
1. As one commentator has stated, "A joint venture could involve any
business enterprise in which two or more persons collaborate to achieve some
commercial goal - a definition that includes all of antitrust, except, perhaps,
some single firm attempts to monopolize ...." Robert Pitofsky, A Framework
For Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEo. L.J. 1605, 1605 (1986); see
also J. Paul McGrath, Antitrust Problems in Negotiating a Joint Venture
Agreement, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 971, 973 (1985) ("[J]oint ventures come in an in-
finite variety of structures and durations and forms and scopes.").
2. Thomas L. Greaney & Jody L. Sindelar, Physician-Sponsored Joint
Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider Organizations, 18
RUTGERS L.J. 513, 564 (1987).
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Firms frequently use joint ventures today as a means of entry
into new markets. The costs of capital, the complexity of tech-
nology, and the hurdles of government regulation have in-
creased the risks of investing in new products and facilities. At
the same time, returns in new markets have been limited by in-
creased competition and by the shorter duration of the modern
product cycle.3 Thus, individual entry to new markets is impos-
sible for many firms. By forming joint ventures with their
competitors, firms can obtain access to the capital, technology,
and other resources that allow them to enter markets from
which they were individually foreclosed. 4 These "[s]trategic al-
liances have become fundamental to doing business in the
1990s." 5 The number of new joint ventures in the United States
has nearly doubled in each of the last ten years, and this trend
may even accelerate in the next several years.6
3. Thomas M. Jorde, Remarks on Acceptable Cooperation Among Com-
petitors in the Face of Growing International Competition, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
519, 521-22 (1989); Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Acceptable Cooperation
Among Competitors in the Face of Growing International Competition, 58 AN-
TrrRusT L.J. 529, 531-33 (1989); Kenneth G. Starling, Trade Deficit and Legis-
lative Surplus: The New Joint Venture Legislation, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 671,
673 (1989).
4. Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Re-
flections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1014-15
(1969).
5. Jeremy Main, Making Global Alliances Work, FORTUNE, Dec. 17, 1990,
at 121, 126. One author has described strategic alliances as "the competitive
weapon of the 1990's." Jordan D. Lewis, Competitive Alliances Redefine Com-
panies, MGMT. REV., Apr. 1991, at 14, 14.
6. Main, supra note 5, at 126; Lewis, supra note 5, at 18. It is quite likely
that many of these strategic alliances will involve the production of new prod-
ucts on a global scale. Joint ventures have been consummated recently be-
tween American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (AT&T) and Mitsubishi
Electric Corp. for memory chips, among Boeing Co. and various Japanese
firms for a new commercial aircraft, between Texas Instruments, Inc. and
Hitachi Ltd. for semiconductors, between Fujitsu Ltd. and McDonnell Douglas
Corp. for new factory automation equipment, and between the Mitsubishi
group and Daimler-Benz AG for an array of new products. Main, supra note
5, at 121; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Fujitsu, McDonnell Douglas to Unveil Alliance
in Factory-Automation Field, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1991, at B3; Bernard Wy-
socki, Jr., Cross-Border Alliances Become Favorite Way to Crack New Markets,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1990, at Al. Joint ventures between U.S. and foreign
firms have also become common in America's basic industries. Joint ventures
now exist in the automobile industry between General Motors Corp. and
Toyota Motor Corp., Ford Motor Co. and Mazda Motor Corp., and Chrysler
Corp. and Mitsubishi Motors Corp., and in the steel industry between National
Steel Corp. and Nippon Kokan Corp., Armco, Inc. and Kowasaki Steel, and
LTV Corp. and Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd. William J. Kolasky, Jr., Re-
cent Developments Affecting Transnational Joint Ventures, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
685, 685 (1989).
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American firms are coming to a realization that occurred to
their Japanese counterparts years ago: that they can often gain
more by collaborating with their rivals than by competing with
them. In Japan, horizontal alliances (called keiretsu) have
helped many companies develop new technologies and break
into new markets.7 In the United States, formerly bitter rivals
are now beginning to enter into a variety of cooperative techni-
cal alliances. These alliances hold the promise of spurring
greater innovation in products and manufacturing processes
than the parties could have achieved on their own. In the last
three years, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler have entered
into joint research programs to develop new composite materi-
als for cars and trucks, eliminate exhaust pollution, recycle
used automobiles, and improve safety.8 Putting aside a "fierce
rivalry [that] has defined the personal computer industry for
the past decade,"9 International Business Machines Corp.
(IBM) and Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple) recently announced
their intention to cooperate in developing a new generation of
operating software, new applications of multimedia and a
means of making IBM and Apple computers more compatible.' 0
One article has described this alliance as the "the equivalent of
General Motors and Ford agreeing to offer cars sharing the
same engines and designs."' '
Despite American firms' increasing reliance on joint ven-
tures, the antitrust status of these arrangements has become
more confused in recent years. Much of the confusion has re-
sulted from the courts' abandonment of the traditional ap-
7. Carla Rapoport, Why Japan Keeps on Winning, FORTUNE, July 15,
1991, at 76, 76.
8. Bradley A. Stertz, In a U-Turn From Past Policy, Big Three of Detroit
Speed Into Era of Cooperation, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991, at B1.
9. Evelyn Richards, IBM, Apple Plan Cooperation, WASH. POST, July 4,
1991, at Al.
10. Id.; see also Paul B. Carroll, IBM to Unveil Plan to Build Macintosh
Clone, WALL ST. J., October 2, 1991, at A3.
11. G. Pascal Zachary & Laurence Hooper, IBM and Apple Open New
Front in PC Wars with Strategic Alliance, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1991, at Al. In
laying the groundwork for approval of the alliance by the United States Fed-
eral Trade Commission and its European counterparts, the two companies
have asserted that the partnership will increase competition. G. Pascal
Zachary, IBM, Apple Outline Plan, But Questions Remain on Products, Rivals'
Response, WALL ST. J., October 3, 1991, at A3, A6. The partners' fears of regu-
latory impediments to their alliance are not unfounded. Microsoft and Intel,
two other dominant companies in the personal computer industry, are cur-
rently under investigation for possible antitrust violations. Id Accordingly,
IBM and Apple have taken steps to ensure other companies are not excluded
from the venture. Id.
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proach of automatically condemning all horizontal restrictions
on competition as per se illegal. Although the Supreme Court
no longer routinely applies the per se rule to all horizontal
competitive restraints, it has not established a new standard for
analyzing these restraints. Thus the federal courts have judged
joint ventures under such divergent standards as a summary
per se rule, a permissive rule of reason, and a merger-based
market analysis.12 These inconsistent approaches have made it
difficult for business executives and practitioners to predict
which types of joint ventures courts will uphold. Such uncer-
tainty has deterred American businesses from forming pro-
competitive cooperative arrangements. In fact, one commenta-
tor has concluded that "some executives view antitrust policy
toward joint ventures in much the same fashion as Sir Winston
Churchill viewed the Soviet Union--'a mystery shrouded in a
riddle wrapped in an enigma."" 3
This Article offers a better approach than traditional per
se, rule of reason, or merger analyses of joint ventures. In their
antitrust assessment of cooperative arrangements among com-
petitors, courts should deem the parties' competitive purpose
determinative. A purpose-based analysis would avoid both the
harshness of the per se rule and the complexities of a market-
based rule of reason or merger analysis. Under this standard, a
court would uphold a joint venture whenever it had a legiti-
mate competitive purpose, such as facilitating its partners' en-
try into a new market. If, however, the parties' intent was only
to facilitate collusion in existing markets, the court would pro-
hibit the arrangement. This approach would ensure that courts
give fair consideration to the determinative competitive charac-
teristics of joint ventures while avoiding unnecessary inquiries
into the parties' market power.
America's earliest antitrust traditions support such a pur-
pose-based approach to joint ventures. In 1898, Judge (later
Chief Justice) Taft offered a similar analysis in United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.14 There, Judge Taft recognized
that the purpose of horizontal restrictions among competitors
should determine their legality.15 According to Judge Taft, if
the partners intend a horizontal competitive restriction to pro-
12. See infra notes 43-89 and accompanying text.
13. J. Paul McGrath, Text of Remarks Prepared for Delivery Before the
18th Annual New England Antitrust Conference, November 2, 1984, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,470, at 56,137 (Nov. 12, 1984).
14. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'dL, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
15. Id. at 282.
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mote the objectives of a separate legitimate transaction, a court
should uphold the restriction as an "ancillary" restraint.16
However, any horizontal restraint which is broader than neces-
sary to achieve the venture's legitimate objectives cannot be
deemed ancillary to the transaction.' 7 Courts should prohibit
such "naked" restraints among competitors because they have
no legitimate efficiency objectives.' 8
Judge Taft's ancillary restraints analysis suggests an effec-
tive two-step approach to the analysis of joint ventures. In the
first step, a court would determine the legality of the joint ven-
ture itself based on the parties' competitive purposes and the
likely impact of the joint venture on competition. If the court
upholds the joint venture, it should then, at the second stage of
the analysis, decide whether any related restraints on competi-
tion among the parties were reasonably necessary to promote
the legitimate purposes of the joint venture. The court would
uphold any legitimate restraints as "ancillary" to the parties'
cooperative arrangement. Such a separate analysis would give
courts the opportunity to fashion remedies short of outright
condemnation of joint ventures that exceed their proper scope.
If a restraint was broader than necessary to achieve the parties'
proper purposes, the court could prohibit the restraint while
leaving the joint venture intact. The court could also limit the
restraint to a more reasonable breadth compatible with the
venture's legitimate purposes. Such an approach would give
clear guidance to businesses and practitioners on the acceptable
scope of joint ventures and their related restraints on
competition.
Part I of this Article explains the competitive advantages
that joint ventures offer and then examines the inconsistent ap-
proaches that courts have utilized to determine the legality of
these arrangements. Part II details a proposed new antitrust
standard for analyzing joint ventures and offers guidance on its
application. Finally, Part III addresses restraints ancillary to
16. Id.
17. IM at 282-83.
18. In the last decade, such an ancillary restraints analysis has been
adopted by many lower federal courts as a means of analyzing agreements
among competitors. See e.g., National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779
F.2d 592, 601-03 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); Rothery Storage
& Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 215-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk Bros.
v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188-91 (7th Cir. 1985); Chicago Professional
Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1357-59 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
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joint ventures. A new standard is appropriate for determining
the legality of ancillary restraints as well as joint ventures
themselves, and this section offers an effective approach and
guidance for its practical application.
I. JOINT VENTURES AND CURRENT ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS
A. THE COMPETITIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF JOINT VENTURES
A search for a new joint venture standard must begin with
an understanding of the unique competitive purposes and ef-
fects of cooperative arrangements among competitors. If the
various forms of business organizations were classified along a
continuum, joint ventures would lie at a mid-point between car-
tels and mergers.19 Joint ventures are distinguished from both
cartels and mergers by the extent to which they integrate the
resources of their partners. A cartel constitutes a naked agree-
ment among competitors unaccompanied by any integration of
resources. In a joint venture, partners contribute assets such as
capital, technology, or production facilities to a common en-
deavor.20 This integration of resources creates economic effi-
ciencies that cannot be achieved by naked agreements among
competitors. Indeed, the efficiencies created by joint ventures
are similar to those resulting from mergers-risk-sharing, econ-
omies of scale, access to complementary resources and the elim-
ination of duplication and waste.21 Joint ventures, however,
differ from mergers in a critical way: because they are less in-
tegrated than mergers, they allow their partners to continue to
compete with each other in the relevant market. While merg-
ers eliminate all competition between the parties, joint ven-
tures, by virtue of their limited scope, leave the parties free to
compete in areas not covered by the joint venture. 22 The par-
19. Edmund W. Kitch, The Antitrust Economics of Joint Ventures, 54 AN.
TrrRUST L.J. 957, 960 (1985).
20. See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTI.
TRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 294-95 (2d ed. 1989); see also Joseph F.
Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1525
(1982); PHnLP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, Antitrust Law 947(a) (1978).
21. See generally U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines (1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 26823, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) % 13,103, at 20,564 (Mar. 28, 1989) [hereinafter DOJ Merger Guidelines]
(discussing the efficiencies that result from mergers).
22. See Brodley, supra note 20, at 1527; Don T. Hibner, Jr., Antitrust Con-
siderations of Joint Ventures, Teaming Agreements, Co-Production and
Leader-Follower Agreements, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 705, 713 (1982); Martin B.
Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do
1991]
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ties to a research and development joint venture can, for exam-
ple, compete in the ultimate production and sale of products
that use the venture's technology. Joint ventures are thus a
distinctive form of business organization characterized by par-
tial integration.
Economists have long recognized that the integration of as-
sets that occurs in a merger may lead to competitive efficien-
cies.23 From an antitrust standpoint, it is preferable to achieve
efficiencies through joint ventures rather than by mergers. A
merger may create efficiencies by removing a competitor from
the relevant market. A joint venture, however, often adds a
new competitor to the market. Indeed, some courts have em-
phasized that the distinguishing characteristic of a joint venture
is its "capability in terms of new productive capacity, new tech-
nology, a new product, or entry into a new market." The in-
tegration of resources that occurs in a joint venture has the
capacity to create something new: a competitive entity that al-
lows its partners to enter markets from which they were indi-
vidually foreclosed.as
A joint venture facilitates market entry primarily through
Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L.
REV. 879, 899-900 (1980); McGrath, supra note 13, % 50,470, at 56,139; Neil E.
Roberts, Cartels and Joint Ventures, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 849, 851 (1989); Adam
B. Weissburg, Note, Reviewing the Law on Joint Ventures with an Eye To-
ward the Future, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 487, 521-22 (1990).
23. See e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1606; AREEDA & TURNER, supra note
20, 1 901.
24. Compact v. Metropolitan Gov't., 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1574 (M.D. Tenn.
1984) (quoting Brodley, supra note 20, at 1526). The Supreme Court has stated
that a joint selling arrangement may make "possible a new product by reaping
otherwise unattainable efficiencies." NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y., 457 U.S. 332, 365 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
Professor Brodley has defined a joint venture as:
an integration between firms that involves a clear addition to produc-
tive capacity, as distinct from a mere union of existing operations.
Thus, a joint venture is more than a marriage; it is a marriage that at
the moment of consummation immediately produces a child. A con-
venient legal test is whether, as in Broadcast Music, the undertaking
involves the creation of a new product or entry into a new market-or
... "a new competitive dimension."
Joseph F. Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures with Foreign Partners, 53 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 73, 75 (1984) (quoting JAMES A. ATwoOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER,
ANTITRusT AND AMERICAN BusINESS ABROAD § 12.33 (2d ed. 1981) and citing
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1979)).
25. Brodley, supra note 25, at 75.
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risk-sharing and the fusion of complementary resources.26
Even relatively large companies have recently formed joint
ventures with their competitors to share the costs of developing
new products. The immense costs involved in producing a new
commercial aircraft prompted Boeing's partnership with vari-
ous Japanese manufacturers.2 7 Large computer manufacturers
have entered into joint ventures to construct new computer
chip factories, which can cost as much as $500 million.2 IBM
and Apple announced their alliance to develop a complex new
computer operating system.29 Teaming agreements have be-
come common among defense contractors faced with the high
costs of developing new products for the military.30
The fusion of partners' complementary abilities often al-
lows a joint venture to penetrate new markets which its part-
ners could not have entered on their own.31 One partner, for
26. Joint ventures allow firms to make complementary assets available to
their competitors when a complete transfer of assets through a merger would
not be feasible. Often a firm cannot sell an asset to a rival because it requires
the asset in its current operations, but it can transfer the asset to a joint ven-
ture partner for a limited purpose. For example, E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. (DuPont) requires its coatings technology for many of its current products.
Phillips can utilize the technology in the production of compact disks. Since
DuPont could not sell the technology to Phillips, the parties entered into a
venture to jointly utilize the technology for producing compact disks. Kitch,
supra note 19, at 965. Similarly, although hospitals cannot sell certain expen-
sive diagnostic equipment (such as CAT-scanners or nuclear magnetic
resonance imagers) to their competitors, they can share this equipment in a
joint venture. See Jonathan M. Joseph, Note, Hospital Joint Ventures: Chart-
ing a Safe Course Through a Sea of Antitrust Regulations, 13 Am. J.L. & MED.
621, 622 (1988).
27. See Main, supra note 5, at 124.
28. Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint Production Ventures, 30
JuRmsTmcs 253, 264 (1990).
29. Zachary & Hooper, supra note 11, at Al; Zachary, supra note 11, at
A6.
30. See Hibner, supra note 22, at 706.
31. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Team-
ing Arrangements Involving Government Contractors, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 1059,
1098-99 (1990); Kitch, supra note 19, at 964-65; see also FREDERIC M. SCHERER,
INDusTRIAL MARxET STRucruRE AND ECONOMC PERFORMANCE 137 (2d ed.
1980) (describing "complementarities" resulting from mergers). One commen-
tator has described the advantages of using a partner's complementary
resources:
rihe reason one works with a partner is precisely because that firm
has skills one needs and lacks. They should take the lead in areas
where they are the experts. It is like the captain of a ship who turns
the wheel over to a harbor pilot when the vessel enters shallow
waters.
Lewis, supra note 5, at 18.
Joint ventures can also be a less costly means than an acquisition to facili-
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example, may possess significant manufacturing capabilities,
while the other's strength may be in marketing. The recent
joint venture between General Motors and Toyota for the pro-
duction of a new small car in Fremont, California combines
Toyota's manufacturing techniques with General Motors'
knowledge of the United States marketplace. 32 Joint venture
partners may also have access to complementary technologies
which, when combined, permit entry into new markets. AT&T
and Nippon Electric Corp. (NEC) recently entered into a joint
venture to produce computer chips using AT&T's computer-
aided design technology and NEC's technology for advanced
logic chips.33 Fujitsu and McDonnell Douglas have established
a joint venture for factory automation products to which
Fujitsu contributed computer hardware and McDonnell Doug-
las contributed software systems.3
The anti-competitive effects of joint ventures are often
minimal because of their narrow scope and limited duration.
Frequently, the partners to a joint venture agree that they will
continue their association only for a specified period. After the
joint venture terminates, the parties will be free to resume full
competition. The prospect of such imminent future competi-
tion will often deter the parties from colluding for anti-compet-
itive purposes during the term of the joint venture. In addition,
most joint ventures are organized for the discrete purpose of re-
searching, producing, or marketing a specific product. Thus,
the parties can continue to compete in fields not covered by the
joint venture.35 In fact, the joint venture partners may use in-
tate entry into a new product market. As one commentator has pointed out,
"General Motors spent $5 billion in 1985 to acquire Hughes Aircraft in order to
use the firm's advanced aerospace technologies. GM could have accomplished
the same, through alliances, for zero investment." Id- at 14.
32. Main, supra note 5, at 126.
33. Wysocki, supra note 6, at Al.
34. Schlesinger, supra note 6, at B3.
35. In 1985, Alcan Aluminum Ltd. and Atlantic Richfield Co. terminated
their original plan to merge their aluminum manufacturing operations and
elected instead to form a joint venture for the production of aluminum.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 620-22 (W.D. Ky.
1985). The Department of Justice, which had opposed the proposed merger,
consented to the joint venture because it allowed the parties to continue to
compete in downstream marketing activities. Id; see also U.S. Department of
Justice International Operations Guidelines (1988), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 13,109, at 20,601 (Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter DOJ International Guidelines]
(pointing out that a joint venture may be less anti-competitive than a merger
when discretion on downstream marketing activities is reserved to members of
venture).
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formation acquired from the venture to compete more effec-
tively against each other, even during the term of the
venture.
36
In particular circumstances, joint ventures can, however,
adversely affect competition.31 The adverse effect may be sig-
nificant when more than one of the joint venture partners was
already active in the joint venture market, or could have en-
tered the market independently.38 In such cases, competition
that otherwise would have existed between the partners in the
joint venture market will be eliminated.3 9 Such a reduction of
competition will occur because the partners will, in the natural
course, refrain from competing with a venture in which they
have a financial interest. Joint ventures can also restrict compe-
tition in other markets in which the partners previously com-
peted. The joint venture may provide a mechanism to cloak
conspiracies to fix prices, allocate territories, or engage in other
anti-competitive activity in such other markets. 40
Joint ventures, therefore, can be powerful devices either to
enhance or to restrict competition. On one hand, cooperative
arrangements among competitors can facilitate entry into new
markets and add a competitive force that otherwise would
36. For example, Toyota has already used information acquired from its
joint venture with General Motors to establish its own production facility in
Georgetown, Kentucky to compete with the American automobile manufactur-
ers. See Paul C. Judge, Toyota Plant is Expected For Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1990, at D4; Jim Mateja, Toyota Bucks Trend, Doubles Plant Output,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 28, 1990, at Cl; Toyota Announces Plan to Build Sec-
ond Auto Plant in US, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MoNIToR, Nov. 29, 1990, at 6. One
commentator has explained:
Part of Japan's advantage is that it often does view the ventures as
largely another form of competition. You shake hands with your
right hand, while making a fist with your left. You learn everything
you can from your Western partner while keeping as many of your
own secrets to yourself. Then you strike out on your own, sometimes
in the very market once controlled by your partner.
Wysocki, supra note 6, at Al; see also id. at A4.
37. See United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964); see also
SULLIVAN & HOVENKAmP, supra note 20, at 294-95.
38. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 165-67, 173-74.
39. See id. at 173-74; Yamaha Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 657
F.2d 971, 977-81 (8th Cir. 1981). Some commentators have argued that partici-
pation in a joint venture by competitors with significant market power can be
anti-competitive simply because the pursuit of "promising independent ap-
proaches" by other firms may be discouraged. Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1095;
see also Eisen, supra note 28, at 266-67 ("[O]nce a JPV [joint production ven-
ture] with antitrust immunity enters the picture, other entrants will find it
difficult to proceed.").
40. Brodley, supra note 20, at 1530-34.
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never have existed.41 On the other hand, firms can design joint
ventures merely to eliminate competition in existing markets.
Any effective standard for analyzing the antitrust status of
joint ventures should clearly distinguish between the different
purposes for which partners establish these arrangements.
B. THE LACK OF A UNIFIED JOINT VENTURE STANDARD
The federal courts have largely failed to recognize that
joint ventures have distinctive competitive characteristics that
require a unified antitrust analysis. The courts have subjected
joint ventures to the inconsistent standards of merger, cartel,
and rule of reason analyses. Indeed, federal policy toward joint
ventures has been termed "one of the darkest corners of anti-
trust law."42 The federal courts' confused approach to joint
ventures has made businesses uncertain about what types of co-
operative arrangements are acceptable under the antitrust laws.
As a result, firms have been unnecessarily deterred from enter-
ing into pro-competitive cooperative arrangements.
1. Merger-Based Analysis of Joint Ventures
In United States v. Penn-Olin Co.,43 the Supreme Court
considered the legality of a joint venture under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act." The Court adopted a structural market ap-
proach similar to that used in analyzing mergers.45 Penn-Olin
was a joint venture between Pennsalt and Olin for the manu-
facture and sale of sodium chlorate in the southeastern United
States. Pennsalt had been manufacturing the product in the
Pacific Northwest prior to the formation of the joint venture.
Although Olin did not manufacture the product, it had the ca-
pability to do so. Both companies had considered entering the
sodium chlorate market in the southeast.46 The Supreme Court
41. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
42. Joseph F. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Anti-
trust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BuLL. 453, 453 (1976); see
also Walter T. Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and Opportuni-
ties, 54 ANTrnusT L.J. 979, 979 (1985).
43. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
44. Id. at 168. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any acquisition of as-
sets or stock "where in any line of commerce... in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1988). Section 7 was applicable in Penn-Olin because the parties
had formed a separate corporation as their joint venture vehicle and each
party had acquired an equity interest in the corporation. 378 U.S. at 168.
45. 378 U.S. at 172.
46. I& at 165-67.
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remanded the case for a determination of whether the joint
venture eliminated potential competition between Pennsalt and
Olin in the production and sale of sodium chlorate in the south-
east.47 Although the Court stated in dictum that joint ventures
may not have as significant anti-competitive effects as merg-
ers,48 its decision, in effect, required the courts to consider the
same structural market factors for joint ventures as for merg-
ers, that is, the relevant product and geographic markets and
the partners' actual or potential share of those markets.49
Some lower federal courts have also adopted a structural
market approach to joint venture analysis. Yamaha Motor Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission50 involved a joint venture to
manufacture outboard motors between Brunswick Corp., the
second largest United States producer, and Yamaha Motor Co.,
the leading Japanese manufacturer. The joint venture was to
produce the motors in Japan and export them to the Uznited
States and other countries.51 In upholding the FTC's dissolu-
tion order, the Eighth Circuit took a market-based approach
similar to a merger analysis.52 The court found that Yamaha
was a potential entrant into the United States market and that,
by foreclosing Yamaha's entry, the joint venture would sub-
stantially lessen competition in the oligopolistic domestic
market.5 3
Analysis of all joint ventures on such a structural basis
would make the legality of cooperative arrangements among
competitors highly uncertain. Merger analysis requires a com-
plicated assessment of the relevant product and geographic
markets, each of the parties' shares of those markets, their
competitors' market shares, and any increase in market concen-
tration that will result from the transaction.- These determi-
nations are fact intensive and time consuming, and their
47. Id. at 173. On remand, the trial court found that potential competition
was not adversely affected because both parties would not have entered the
relevant market independently. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F.
Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
48. The Penn-Olin Court explained: "This is not to say that a joint ven-
ture is controlled by the same criteria as the merger or conglomeration. The
merger eliminates one of the participating corporations from the market while
a joint venture creates a new competitive force therein." 378 U.S. at 170.
49. 1d. at 170, 176-77.
50. 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 973-74.
52. Id. at 977-79.
53. Id. at 979.
54. See DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, 13,103, at 20,555-60; see
also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 20, 907(a).
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outcome is difficult to predict. Many businesses will be de-
terred from entering into joint ventures simply because of the
uncertainties and transaction costs involved in analyzing their
structural market effects.55 Since joint ventures are often less
anti-competitive than mergers and frequently do not have any
adverse market effects at all, the courts are not justified in ap-
plying to joint ventures a structural merger-based analysis with
such a significant deterrent effect.
2. The Inconsistent Analysis of Horizontal Restraints
In order to carry out its purpose, a joint venture may re-
strict its partners from engaging in certain competitive activi-
ties. These restrictions may include agreements by partners
not to compete with the joint venture, to limit their dealings
with third parties, or to refrain from competing with each
other.5 6 In some cases, the federal courts have found these
agreements to be per se illegal under Section I of the Sherman
Act5 7 without any consideration of their potential beneficial ef-
fects,58 while in other cases the courts have upheld the agree-
ments under a more permissive "rule of reason" standard.5 9
The courts have failed to clarify under what circumstances a
per se or rule of reason approach is appropriate. Businesses
and practitioners therefore find it difficult to predict whether a
55. Potential joint venturers may have to make a Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-
merger filing if they plan to acquire an equity interest in a joint venture with
assets of $10 million or more. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 529 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)
(1988)); 16 C.F.R. § 801.40 (1989). One commentator has noted that "[it] is pos-
sible that the mere cost and uncertainty of the Hart-Scott-Rodino process itself
can discourage businesses from forming production joint ventures that would
require pre-merger notification." Starling, supra note 3, at 680. Indeed, the
pre-merger review process for the General Motors-Toyota joint venture took
ten months to complete. Robert C. Weinbaum, Production Joint Ventures:
The General Motors-Toyota Experience, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 709, 711 (1989).
56. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 20, 947.
57. Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "every contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
58. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Under the
per se rule, practices having a "pernicious effect on competition" and lacking
"any redeeming virtue" are conclusively presumed to be illegal under Section
1 without any inquiry into the parties' competitive purpose or the market ef-
fect of the restraint. Id. For a discussion of the per se rule, see infra notes 60-
89 and accompanying text.
59. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918).
Under traditional formulations of the rule of reason, a restraint cannot be
found illegal until a court has considered all factors bearing on its potential
competitive purpose and effect. 1d. at 238. For a discussion of the rule of rea-
son, see infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
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court will consider the potential efficiency justifications of com-
petitive restrictions implemented in connection with joint
ventures.
Ironically, much of the confusion over the dividing line be-
tween per se and rule of reason analysis has resulted from the
Supreme Court's increased willingness to consider the effi-
ciency justifications of horizontal restraints. Prior to the late
1970s, the Supreme Court almost automatically applied the per
se rule to strike down horizontal restraints among competitors
which affected prices or territories, regardless of whether those
restraints were implemented in connection with efficiency-en-
hancing cooperative arrangements. In Timken Co. v. United
States,60 the Supreme Court held that territorial and price-fix-
ing restraints among the partners to a European joint venture
were per se illegal. 61 United States v. Sealy, Inc.62 involved the
summary condemnation of territorial and price-fixing restraints
that were part of a promotional plan among small bedding
manufacturers. 63 In Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States,6
the Court found per se illegal a joint operating agreement be-
tween Arizona's two major newspapers that set common sub-
scription and advertising rates.6 The Court applied the per se
rule in United States v. Topco Associates66 to territorial restric-
tions implemented by an organization of small grocers attempt-
ing to promote their private label brands in competition with
larger chain stores.6 7 Finally, in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,68 the Court summarily pro-
hibited an engineering society from implementing a ban on
competitive bidding that ostensibly was intended to promote
the safety and quality of engineering on public projects.69 In
none of these cases did the Court consider whether the re-
straints at issue could have been justified as incidental to an ef-
ficiency-enhancing cooperative arrangement.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
60. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
61. Id, at 598.
62. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
63. Id at 351.
64. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
65. Id, at 135-36.
66. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
67. Id at 606-12.
68. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
69. Id, at 694-96.
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Inc.,70 decided by the Supreme Court in 1979, signaled a new
approach by the Court to horizontal restraints. Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. was an association of approximately 20,000 music copy-
right owners which licensed commercial use of the copyrighted
works.71 The Court recognized that because the licenses estab-
lished an identical price for each of the copyrighted composi-
tions they constituted horizontal price-fixing "in the literal
sense." 72 Instead of finding the licenses per se illegal, however,
the Court expressed a willingness to consider the pro-competi-
tive aspects of the cooperative arrangement.73 The Court
stated: "Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are
also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes,
where the agreement on price is necessary to market the prod-
uct at all."74 The Court concluded that the licenses should be
analyzed under the rule of reason because of the virtual impos-
sibility that members of the association could compete effec-
tively in the market for musical compositions without
participating in the licensing agreement.75
The Supreme Court's willingness to consider efficiency jus-
tifications for horizontal price-fixing in Broadcast Music repre-
sented a radical departure from its earlier per se approach to
competitive restrictions ancillary to cooperative arrangements.
The Court's approach can be viewed as requiring an inquiry
into the substantive competitive purpose and effect of any
agreements necessary for insuring the effectiveness of a joint
venture.
In several subsequent cases, however, the Court confused
the implications of its holding in Broadcast Music by continuing
to apply a standard of summary illegality to various restrictions
70. 441 U.S. 1 (1979), rev' Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
71. Idi at 5. Broadcast Music, Inc. granted a blanket license, which al-
lowed access to all the copyrighted works in its repertory, to purchasers for a
percentage of their revenues. Broadcast Music then reimbursed the copyright
owners according to usage. Id.
72. Id at 8. The Court of Appeals had previously held that the blanket
license constituted illegal price-fixing and was a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act. 562 F.2d at 140.
73. 441 U.S. at 19-23. The Court noted that the association facilitated the
marketing and policing of the copyrighted works, and the arrangement saved
transaction costs of copyright owners and would-be users. Id at 20.
74. Id at 23.
75. Id at 20-23. The Court emphasized the prohibitive costs of individual
sales transactions and the fact that the blanket license functioned as a practi-
cal solution to the problem posed by a market containing a high number of
owners, users, and compositions. Id at 20.
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incidental to competitors' cooperative arrangements. In Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,76 for example, the
Court applied the per se rule when a physicians' organization
established maximum fees that its members could charge under
an insurance plan.77 The physicians had argued that the per se
rule should not apply because beneficial effects, such as lower
premiums and fuller insurance coverage, were likely to result
from the maximum fee arrangement. 78 The Court concluded
that even when potential efficiencies are involved, "the anti-
competitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements
justifies their facial invalidation."79 Consideration of efficien-
cies, however, is precisely what the Court had appeared to man-
date in Broadcast Music.0
The 1984 case of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma8 l involved restrictions imposed by the NCAA
on the frequency that member colleges' sports teams could ap-
pear on television and the fees the colleges could receive from
the networks.8 2 The Court concluded that a per se approach
was not appropriate because the NCAA had to impose certain
horizontal restrictions on competition, such as requirements for
academic credentials and the number of players on each team,
in order to promote collegiate athletics.8 3 However, the Court
then proceeded to characterize the television restrictions as
price and output restraints that could be summarily condemned
without any consideration of their market effect84 Thus, de-
spite the Court's professed rule of reason analysis, the actual
approach followed in NCAA was much closer to a per se
analysis.8 5
In 1986, in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists,8 6 the Court held that the rule of reason should
determine the legality of a dentists' association's refusal to sup-
76. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
77. Id. at 342-57.
78. Id- at 348-49.
79. Id at 351.
80. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
81. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
82. Id. at 91-94.
83. Id at 101-02.
84. Id. at 104-10.
85. Indeed, NCAA has been described not as a true rule of reason ap-
proach but as "an explanation of why the Court should have applied the per se
rule." Wesley J. Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments:
Horizontal Restrictions, Efjiciency and the Per Se Rule, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1019, 1055 (1986).
86. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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ply X-rays to insurance companies seeking to evaluate benefit
claims.8 7 However, as in NCAA, the Court's actual analysis was
more like a per se approach. The Court concluded that a re-
fusal by a group of competitors to supply a desired customer
service (i.e., the forwarding of X-rays to the insurance compa-
nies) adversely affected competition no less than price-fixing,
and therefore the practice could be summarily condemned
without any market analysis.8 8
The Supreme Court's inconsistent approach to horizontal
restraints has created serious doctrinal confusion over the
proper analysis of cooperative arrangements among competi-
tors. Although it appears that the Court no longer applies the
per se rule as a matter of course to restraints ancillary to such
arrangements, the actual approach that the Court will follow
remains unclear. Business executives contemplating joint ven-
tures are left to wonder whether a court will summarily con-
demn incidental competitive restrictions, as in Maricopa,
NCAA, and Indiana Federation of Dentists, or whether a court
will be willing to consider certain efficiency justifications, as in
Broadcast Music.89
3. Deficiencies in Rule of Reason Analysis
The Supreme Court's failure to distinguish per se from
rule of reason analysis has not been the only barrier to the
adoption of an effective standard for the antitrust analysis of
joint ventures. Even if the Supreme Court clearly stated the
circumstances in which the rule of reason should apply to joint
ventures, the analysis of these arrangements would still be
muddled because of the inherent deficiencies in the rule of rea-
son standard.
To begin with, the courts have never adequately explained
how the rule of reason should be applied. The classic formula-
tion of the rule of reason, set forth by Justice Brandeis in 1918
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,90 includes such fac-
tors as the circumstances peculiar to the defendant's business,
the conditions before and after the restraint, the nature and
purpose of the restraint, and the competitive effects of the re-
87. Id at 459.
88. Id.
89. The confusion for practitioners was compounded by the fact that the
Court termed its summary analysis a per se approach in certain situations and
a rule of reason approach in others. See supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
90. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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straint.91 Subsequent Supreme Court cases have failed to re-
fine this open-ended formula. In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.,92 for example, the Court cited Justice Brandeis's
formulation without indicating the relevance or weight to be af-
forded any particular factor.9 3 The Court established a rule of
reason approach for joint ventures in United States v. Penn-
Olin Co.94 that was no less open-ended. The Penn-Olin Court
indicated that the market power of the joint venturers and
their competitors, the potential market power of the joint ven-
ture itself, the reasons for the joint venture's existence, and
various other conditions in the relevant market should all be
considered.95 It gave no guidance on how a court should ulti-
mately weigh and balance those factors.9 6
Without any formulation of the relative weight to be given
the various factors in its open-ended formula, the rule of reason
has lost most of its utility in antitrust analysis.9 7 The absence
of clear standards makes it difficult to predict the outcome of
particular cases. [f all market conditions must be considered,
the courts will presumably inquire into the market power of
the parties to the restraints at issue before ruling on their legal-
ity. Such an inquiry requires a determination of the relevant
product and geographic markets and the shares of the markets
held by the parties. Most judges and juries are simply not capa-
ble of making the economic decisions required by a full rule of
reason market power analysis.98
The problems with the rule of reason have prompted many
suggestions for reform. The Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission have each proposed a "structured" rule of
91. Id. at 238.
92. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
93. Id. at 49 n.15.
94. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
95. Id. at 176-77.
96. Id. at 177. Several commentators have noted the lack of guidance in
the Penn-Olin formula. See David A. Clanton, Horizontal Agreements and the
General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1239, 1251-52 (1984);
David L. Foster et al., National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 as a Shield
from the Antitrust Laws, 5 J.L. & CoM. 347, 356-57 (1985); Kovacic, supra note
31, at 1083 n.123; Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1062.
97. Brodley, supra note 20, at 1523.
98. Economists themselves can argue indefinitely over the single issue of
what constitutes a proper product market in a rule of reason antitrust case.
One commentator has concluded that "the costs of such an analysis are not
worth the effort." Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule
of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 153-54 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972)).
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
reason that relies on the parties' market power as the decisive
factor in the balancing test.9 Several federal courts have pro-
posed a similar "market filter" which includes a threshold anal-
ysis to determine whether a defendant possesses market
power.100 Similarly, commentators have advocated a structured
rule of reason for joint ventures based on the partners' market
power.101 None of these proposals, however, has addressed the
primary deficiency of the current rule of reason approach-the
complexity of market power analysis. Since each of the propos-
als continues to concentrate on the market power of the parties
to the restraint, none is likely to be very useful.
Attempts at legislative reform of joint venture antitrust
analysis have been no more successful than efforts by enforce-
ment agencies, judges, and academics. The legislation enacted
to date represents a piecemeal approach that has done little to
clarify the standards of legality. For example, the Export Trad-
ing Company Act of 1982102 grants an exemption from antitrust
liability to firms whose joint export activities will not adversely
affect competition in the United States. 0 3 However, the Ex-
port Trading Company Act is very limited in scope and does not
even protect the joint manufacture of products for export.1°4
The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984105 directs the
99. See DOJ International Guidelines, supra note 35, 13,109, at 20,600;
see also In re Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549,
604 (1980) (describing a structured method for analyzing horizontal restraints);
Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1083 n.124; Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Rea-
son, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 861-62 (1988).
100. If the plaintiff fails to prove that the defendant has market power, the
restraint is deemed legal and the analysis is at an end. See, e.g., Ryko Mfg. Co.
v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1026
(1988); Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1986);
Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1435 (7th Cir. 1986); Hand v.
Central Transp., 779 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1985); Jack Walter & Sons v. Morton
Bldgs., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Gen-
eral Leaseways v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir.
1984); Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir.
1983); Valley Liquors v. Renfield Importers, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982);
Muenster Butane v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981).
101. See e.g., Alden F. Abbott, Joint Production Ventures: The Case for An-
titrust Reform, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 715, 732 (1989); Joe Sims, Developments in
Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 433, 439 (1989); Greaney &
Sindelar, supra note 2, at 571-72.
102. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021
(1988)).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (1988).
104. Id. §§ 4002, 4013
105. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305
(1988)).
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courts to analyze research and development joint ventures
under the rule of reason.10 6 The Act provides that, if a notifica-
tion filing for a joint venture is made with the Department of
Justice and the FTC within ninety days after the parties enter
into a written agreement, the joint venture will be exempt
from treble damages if it is ever held to be illegal.10 7 The Act,
however, covers only a narrow range of activities. It does not
protect production, marketing, or even certain applied re-
search. 0 8 Moreover, the National Cooperative Research Act
does not define how a court should conduct the rule of reason
analysis-it merely states that the analysis should take "into
account all relevant factors affecting competition, including, but
not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined, rele-
vant research and development markets."'0 9 Although Con-
gress believed that such a codification of the rule of reason
would clarify the legality of research and development ven-
tures, the Act may in fact have the opposite effect." 0 The re-
quirement that the courts consider all relevant factors may
preclude use of the new structured rule of reason adopted by
the FTC, Department of Justice, and many federal courts in re-
cent years. Furthermore, in the case of new technologies, any
definition of the relevant research and development market
and the market power of the competitors therein will be partic-
ularly difficult."' The failure of Congress to provide a clear
standard for the legality of joint ventures is especially dis-
turbing given the blanket exemptions available in Japan and
the European Economic Community to competitors engaged in
cooperative undertakings. 1 2
106. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1988).
107. Id- § 4305.
108. See Sara G. Zwart, Innovate, Integrate and Cooperate: Antitrust
Changes and Challenges in the U.S. and European Economic Community, 1989
UTAH L. REV. 63, 89.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 4302.
110. See Foster et al., supra note 96, at 350.
111. See id at 358.
112. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 3, at 547-50; Abbott, supra note 101, at
724, 726. Several measures have been proposed in Congress recently to create
a greater safe harbor for domestic joint ventures. Measures in the 101st Con-
gress included a bill establishing antitrust immunity for joint production ven-
tures. See S. 1006, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Another measure would have
provided complete immunity from antitrust damages (but not from injunctive
relief) for pro-competitive joint ventures certified by the Government. See
H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). On January 3, 1991, a bill was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives to extend the provisions of the National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 to joint production ventures. See H.R. 27,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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C. THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
American firms considering joint ventures today face many
unanswerable questions: Will the joint venture be subjected to
a merger-based assessment of its structural impact on actual
and potential competition in a particular market? If so, what
market will the court deem relevant? Will the court take a
rule of reason approach to the joint venture and, if so, what fac-
tors will be decisive? Will horizontal competitive restrictions
related to the joint venture be upheld as integral to its success
or will they be struck down as per se illegal? Such fundamen-
tal uncertainties put potential joint venture partners at signifi-
cant legal risk.
The legal consequences of entering into an illegal joint ven-
ture can be quite severe. Businesses and individuals can be lia-
ble for criminal sanctions under the Sherman Act.1- 3 The
Clayton Act imposes liability for treble damages and attorneys'
fees and authorizes divestiture and other injunctive relief.11-4
Government contractors can lose their right to do business with
the federal government.115 These consequences can be invoked
by many parties, including the Department of Justice and the
FTC, as well as competitors, customers, and suppliers of the
partners.116 Even if a defendant is not ultimately found liable,
the costs of defending a lawsuit can be prohibitive. 117
Under the courts' current approach, joint ventures are sub-
ject to greater antitrust risks than mergers. A former assistant
attorney general has pointed out that a joint venture is riskier
"because you don't find out it's wrong until years later."''118 Un-
like mergers of significant size, joint ventures are often not
structured in a manner that requires pre-transaction clearance
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 7 (1988).
114. See id. §§ 45, 46.
115. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2(a)(2), 9.407-2(a)(2) (1990).
116. See McGrath, supra note 1, at 971-72. Fellow partners are also poten-
tial litigants. One partner may attempt to enforce another partner's obligation
to contribute capital, technology or other assets to a joint venture. As an af-
firmative defense, the other partner may assert that the joint venture is illegal
under the antitrust laws. See Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1075.
117. The litigation concerning the Northrop-McDonnell Douglas teaming
agreement for the production of the F-18 aircraft, for example, lasted six years
and consumed at least $40 million in legal fees and thousands of hours of man-
agement time before it was settled. See Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1075 n.83.
118. New England Conference Finds More Reality than Rhetoric in
Promises for Enforcement, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1490, at
663,669 (November 8, 1990) [hereinafter New England Conference] (comments
by Donald Baker).
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from the FTC or Justice Department under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act." 9 Thus, joint venture partners are often subject to
antitrust challenges at any time during the life of the joint ven-
ture. As the joint venture's share of the relevant market
changes, the antitrust risks can increase significantly. Competi-
tors, in fact, may be more inclined to challenge joint ventures
that succeed over a period of time in increasing their market
share.12°
Legal risks continue to deter American firms from forming
pro-competitive joint ventures.' 12 Although the courts may be
more inclined today to consider efficiency arguments for coop-
erative arrangements among competitors, the outcome of their
analysis remains uncertain. The courts have been unable to de-
fine a "safe harbor" in which joint ventures will be deemed le-
gitimate on their face. Many firms will perceive the mere
possibility of an antitrust challenge to a joint venture as a risk
not worth taking.122 As long as the courts continue to send out
confusing signals on the standards of legality for joint ventures,
businesses will continue to refrain from beneficial cooperative
activity because of the perceived antitrust risks.
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1988) (mandating notification and waiting period
for mergers). Premerger notification is only required when joint venture part-
ners form a separate corporation and contribute assets of $10 million or more
to the corporation. See supra note 55.
120. See Charles F. Rule, The Administration's View on Joint Ventures, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 1121, 1123-24 (1985); Discussion of Joint Venture Hypothetical
A, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1157, 1171 (1985) [hereinafter Hypothetical A] (comments
by Don T. Hibner, Jr.). But see Eisen, supra note 28, at 262 (arguing that the
antitrust standards for mergers and joint ventures should be different because
of the need to wait to assess the impact of a joint venture on competition).
121. Dick Thornburgh, U.S. Firms Get Tripped in Race to the Marketplace:
Grant Antitrust Exemptions. . ., WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1988, at A10; see also
Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1605; Jorde & Teece, supra note 3, at 545. Commen-
tators have concluded that Congress was concerned about the deterrent effect
joint venture antitrust standards would have on future joint ventures when it
enacted the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984. See Foster et al.,
supra note 96, at 353. But see Eisen, supra note 28, at 261 (arguing that "the
antitrust laws ... are not a large barrier to consortia formation").
122. This phenomenon was evident in American firms' reaction to the pas-
sage of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984. As one commentator
noted, "Despite the fact that existing law clearly permitted most research and
development (R&D) joint ventures, it took the passage of this statute, plus the
active encouragement of the Commerce Department, to ease the reluctance of
many companies to even discuss joint R&D with competitors." Ira M. Mill-
stein, The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on America's Ability to Restructure Its
Industries and Proposals for Change, 47 U. PrTT. L. REV. 713, 719 (1986).
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II. A NEW JOINT VENTURE STANDARD
A. THE NEED FOR A PURPOSE-BASED APPROACH
The competitive characteristics of joint ventures are clear
enough to allow the courts to adopt a single, easily understood
standard for analyzing these arrangements. The standard
should define certain safe harbors for pro-competitive ventures
while prohibiting and deterring arrangements adversely affect-
ing competition. Such an approach would preserve judicial re-
sources by making the dividing line between permissible and
illegal conduct easier for the courts to determine. It would also
free American businesses to engage in beneficial cooperative ac-
tivity without fear of antitrust liability. Neither a merger-
based analysis, a traditional per se approach, nor a market-
based rule of reason is appropriate for the analysis of joint ven-
tures. Merger analysis disregards the fact that joint ventures
are not likely to eliminate all commercial rivalry among their
partners.1 3 Per se analysis is inappropriate because the partial
integration resulting from joint ventures creates substantial ef-
ficiencies. 124 The rule of reason should not apply because it im-
poses a complex market analysis that is unnecessary for
cooperative arrangements that frequently pose no competitive
problems.32
Instead of the traditional alternatives, the courts should
adopt a new intermediate approach based on the purpose of the
parties to a joint venture. The market impact of horizontal
competitive restrictions can often be inferred from the pur-
poses of the parties to the restraints.12 6 Courts are much more
123. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 60-89 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 19 (1979) ("[Olur inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here
because it tends to show effect.., the purpose of the practice are to threaten
the proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy .... ); Chi-
cago Professional Sports, Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 1991-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,308, at 65,171 (N.D. Il. 1991) ("Knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.") (citing Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918)); see also New England Confer-
ence, supra note 118, at 663,669 (comments by Eleanor Fox) ("Purpose is often
a good key to determining probable effect."). Many antitrust commentators,
however, believe that purpose is not a valid indicator of competitive effects
and that a market-based inquiry should be given greater priority. See, e.g.,
Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1622 (" '[P]urpose' is an unreliable barometer of le-
gality in antitrust."); Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating Anti-
trust Procedure and Substance After Northwest Wholesale Stationers:
Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof and Boycotts, 72
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capable of determining a defendant's competitive purpose than
of divining the market impact of restrictions on competition 2 7
A purpose-based analysis fairly puts the onus on the defendant,
who has access to and controls the documents and witnesses
most likely to demonstrate the reason why the partners imple-
mented particular competitive restraints.
A purpose-based analysis is particularly appropriate for
joint ventures. Often the specific market impact of a joint ven-
ture "will not be determinable until some time in the fu-
ture."'2 s However, the parties' competitive purpose at the time
they form a joint venture will usually indicate whether the
venture will enhance competition in the relevant market. If
the parties' purpose is to integrate their resources to enter a
new market from which they were individually foreclosed, the
joint venture will have a beneficial competitive effect. A new
competitor that otherwise would not have existed will be added
to the relevant market. A court can deem this type of joint
venture legal on its face without any consideration of its spe-
cific competitive effects. Thus a purpose-based analysis would
provide a safe harbor that would encourage firms to enter into
joint ventures which enhance competition in new markets.
A purpose-based analysis would also recognize those cir-
cumstances which warrant further inquiry into the competitive
effects of joint ventures. Joint ventures can have an adverse as
well as a beneficial impact when the parties' purpose is not to
penetrate a new market but simply to integrate their resources
in an existing market. Such a venture can enhance the parties'
efficiency in the current market, but it can also eliminate com-
petition between the parties. In such cases a court should
weigh the potential anti-competitive effects of the arrangement
against the efficiencies which the joint venture could create.
VA. L. REV. 1015, 1044 (1986) ("Although 'purpose and effect' have always
been the central concerns of antitrust analysis, market impact is clearly the
more dominant of the two concepts."); Rand McQuinn, Boycott Law After
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 839, 839 (1989) ("[Tihis
[purpose-based] approach has created confusion and the potential for silly
results.").
127. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 754 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[In] antitrust, as in many other areas of the law, mo-
tivation matters and fact-finders are able to distinguish bad from good in-
tent."); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)
("Judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures
and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice's effect on
competition.").
128. Hypothetical A, supra note 120, at 1166 (comments by Don T. Hibner,
Jr.).
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Under a purpose-based approach, such a balancing test could be
easily undertaken. In fact, in most cases the competitive impact
of a joint venture would be apparent from the parties' objec-
tives for the venture, and no market power analysis would be
required.
In addition, a purpose-based analysis would permit the
courts to consider whether any ancillary restrictions on compe-
tition are necessary to promote the legitimate objectives of a
joint venture. By separating consideration of ancillary re-
straints from deliberations on the joint venture itself, courts
can fashion remedies short of outright condemnation of the en-
tire transaction.12 9 If an ancillary restraint is necessary to ef-
fectuate the parties' objectives for the joint venture, it should
be upheld. If the restraint is broader than necessary to achieve
the parties' legitimate purposes, a court can either strike it
down or limit it to a more reasonable scope. In either case, the
anti-competitive aspects of the ancillary restraint can be reme-
died without prohibiting the joint venture itself.
There is considerable precedent for applying a purpose-
based analysis to joint ventures. The federal courts have moved
increasingly'in recent years toward adoption of an "ancillary re-
straints" analysis based on the purpose of horizontal restric-
tions on competition. Prior to the late 1970s, the ascendancy of
the per se approach to horizontal restrictions prevented further
development of the ancillary restraints analysis,130 which was
first set forth by Judge Taft in 1898.131 However, the analysis
was revitalized by the Supreme Court's willingness in Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.132 to
consider the potential efficiency justifications of horizontal
price-fixing. 13 3 Several lower federal courts subsequently used
129. In certain cases, the courts have inappropriately applied a per se anal-
ysis to joint ventures because of their mistaken belief that overly broad ancil-
lary restraints taint an entire joint venture. For example, the dissent in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir. 1984), argued that the majority's decision on the legality of territorial re-
strictions was "tantamount to ruling that the N.F.L. structure is itself per se
invalid under the Sherman Act." Id. at 1408 (Williams, J., dissenting).
130. Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 2, at 565-66.
131. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
132. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
133. Although it did not cite United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) qff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), the Broadcast Music Court
described the blanket license in terms which evoked Judge Taft's approach.
The Court stated: "The blanket license, as we see it, is not a 'naked restrain[t]
of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition,' White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), but rather accompanies the integration
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an ancillary restraints analysis to evaluate competitive restric-
tions among the partners to joint ventures. In Rothery Storage
& Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 3 for example, Judge Bork
concluded that the Supreme Court's recent decisions on hori-
zontal restraints had expressly adopted the ancillary restraints
doctrine and, in so doing, overruled the blanket per se approach
to restrictions incidental to joint ventures.135
Unfortunately, the case law in the Supreme Court has not
been as clear as Judge Bork indicated in Rothery. Considerable
confusion remains over the appropriate place for per se, rule of
reason, and merger analysis in the joint venture context.136
Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the outcome of several
of the Supreme Court's seemingly contradictory opinions as
consistent with an intermediate purpose-based standard for the
analysis of joint ventures. Certain cases can be viewed as up-
holding ancillary restraints necessary to achieve the legitimate
objectives of cooperative arrangements. In Broadcast Music,
for example, the Court refused to prohibit a price-fixing ar-
rangement that allowed the association of musical composers to
market a new product that otherwise would have been unavail-
able to the public.137 Similarly, in Northwest Wholesale Sta-
tioners, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery,13 8 the Court upheld
membership restrictions necessary for insuring the effective-
ness of a pro-competitive purchasing cooperative among small
office supply stores.1 39 The Court prohibited ancillary re-
straints, however, in those cases in which they were broader
than necessary to promote the legitimate purposes of a joint
venture. In United States v. Topco Associates, 40 the territorial
restrictions on each grocery store were not required to promote
the private label brand of the group-buying association,' 4 ' and
of sales, monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use." 441
U.S. at 20.
134. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 229; see also supra note 18.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 42-98.
137. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20.
138. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
139. Id. at 295.
140. 414 U.S. 801 (1973) (per curiam), affg 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,485, at 94,153 (N.D. IlM. 1973).
141. Id- In the entry of a final decree against Topco, the district court did
not prohibit the joint venture itself but approved limited areas of primary re-
sponsibility and profit pass-over clauses as less restrictive alternatives to the
exclusive territories. 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 74,485, at 94,153. The
Supreme Court affirmed. 414 U.S. 801.
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in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma'4
the restrictions on member colleges' television rights were not
necessary to promote collegiate athletics.143
B. DETERMINING WHEN A JOINT VENTURE STANDARD IS
APPROPRIATE
Before undertaking a purpose-based analysis of a coopera-
tive arrangement, a court should confirm that the arrangement
does, in fact, possess the distinguishing competitive features of
a joint venture. Joint ventures are an intermediate form of
business organization that lie between the extremes of cartels
and mergers on the continuum of cooperative arrangements. 44
The place of a joint venture on the continuum depends upon
the extent to which the arrangement integrates the resources
of the parties. The critical feature distinguishing joint ventures
from cartels and mergers is partial integration. 45 If a coopera-
tive arrangement does not possess a certain minimum degree of
integration, it will be incapable of creating efficiencies. A court
should classify this type of arrangement as a cartel and subject
it to per se analysis. Other cooperative arrangements are so
well integrated that they eliminate all competition between the
parties in the relevant market. A court should classify these
arrangements as mergers and analyze them under a structural
market approach.
When partners contribute assets such as technology, capi-
tal, or facilities to a joint venture, there should be no question
that sufficient integration exists to avoid the cartel designation.
In these cases, the parties will have pooled their resources to
establish a new competitive entity. A closer question arises,
however, when the parties do not contribute any tangible re-
sources to their cooperative endeavor, but merely undertake to
coordinate their efforts in particular ways. One of the leading
commentators on joint ventures believes that unless the part-
ners make a contribution of assets there is no justification for
treating the new entity as a joint venture.146 Such an approach,
however, is unduly harsh. If the partners have a legitimate ef-
ficiency objective, a court should classify their arrangement as a
142. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
143. Id. at 117-18; see also M. Laurence Popofsky, Integration, Market
Power and Necessity: Guideposts for the Practitioner, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1141,
1145-46 (1985).
144. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying note 22.
146. Brodley, supra note 20, at 1526.
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joint venture even if the objective can be accomplished solely
through contractual undertakings. The critical inquiry should
be whether the partners merely intend the arrangement to dis-
guise naked restrictions on price or output, or whether their
purpose is to promote economic efficiency.147
Although the distinction between cartels and joint ven-
tures may not be obvious when the only integration between
the parties is contractual, the courts should be able to deter-
mine when the parties have a legitimate efficiency objective. 148
The types of contractual commitments undertaken by the part-
ners will usually reveal whether they legitimately intend to en-
hance their efficiency. Group buying organizations, for
example, may require their participants to purchase certain
minimum amounts through the organization. Such a commit-
ment can give buying organizations composed of small firms
the purchasing clout that allows them to compete more effec-
tively against their larger competitors. Similarly, a group sell-
ing organization composed of small firms may require its
members to market their products exclusively through the or-
147. See Roberts, supra note 22, at 853. The Department of Justice defines
legitimate joint ventures as those arrangements "that involve some economic
integration of the venture members' operations beyond the mere coordination
of their pricing and output decisions." DOJ International Guidelines, supra
note 35, 13,109.84, at 20,621 (Illustrative Case 5); see also id. at 20,628; Popof-
sky, supra note 143, at 1142-43.
148. The courts have been able to distinguish legitimate cooperative ar-
rangements from "sham" joint ventures whose only purpose is to restrict com-
petition. Cartel rules have been applied to cooperative arrangements for
which defendants could raise no plausible efficiency arguments other than
their desire to suppress competition. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), for example, the aggregate of price-fixing and terri-
torial restraints between the parties made it clear that the parties' attempt "to
suppress competition among themselves and others [could not] be justified by
labeling the project a 'joint venture."' Id. at 598. In Federal Trade Commis-
ion v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), the sole objective of
the dentists' union was illegitimate: to preclude insurers from obtaining pa-
tients' X-rays. I&i at 451. Naked horizontal agreements not to compete, world-
wide divisions of territories effected through patent cross-licensing, joint sales
agencies designed to fix competitors' prices, and agreements to forego competi-
tive bidding have all been found per se illegal despite the defendants' argu-
ments that they were engaged in a "joint venture." See United Staies v.
Capitol Serv. Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (agreements not to
compete among movie theaters), aff'd, 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (patent cross-
licensing); see also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1978) (foregoing of competitive bidding); United States v.
Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Virginia Excel-
sior Mills, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 256 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1958)
(joint sales agency agreement).
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ganization in order to assure that it can negotiate more effec-
tively with large purchasers. A court should analyze
cooperative arrangements with such legitimate purposes as
joint ventures rather than as cartels, even though they involve
only a relatively small degree of integration.
At the integrated end of the continuum, it should be rela-
tively easy for the courts to distinguish joint ventures from
mergers. The distinction is important because a more permis-
sive analysis is only appropriate for cooperative arrangements
with a narrow scope. If a joint venture is so broad that it elimi-
nates all commercial rivalry between the partners, it should be
subjected to a structural market analysis. When two parties
contribute to a joint venture all of their assets used in a partic-
ular business, the venture eliminates all competition between
them in the relevant market. The substance of such a transac-
tion is no different than a merger. As in a merger, a single en-
tity (the joint venture) takes the place of two former
competitors in the relevant market. These transactions have
the same competitive effect as an acquisition of one partner's
business by the other, and they should be subject to the same
antitrust standard as an acquisition: a structural analysis to de-
termine their specific impact on competition in the relevant
market.' 49
149. Many courts have applied merger analysis to joint ventures which
eliminate all commercial rivalry between their partners. In Citizens Publish-
ing v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), the combination of two newspapers'
advertising and circulation functions precluded future competition. Id at 134.
The Court held that price-fixing and noncompetition agreements between the
parties were illegal per se under the Sherman Act. Id. at 135-36. In his con-
curring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that if the operating agreement between
the two papers had provided that it would continue indefinitely "we would
have had no choice but to treat the transaction in the same way we would
treat a total corporate merger." Id at 141 (Harlan, J., concurring). In United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), competition was elimi-
nated by a joint committee's pooling of the profits of formerly competitive
movie theaters. Id at 149. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the
district court which required dissolution of the pooling agreements. Id In
United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989), the district
court applied a merger analysis to a joint venture to which two manufacturers
contributed their entire railroad track equipment business. Id at 1414-30. The
court granted the government's motion for a preliminary injunction prevent-
ing the proposed joint venture. Id at 1411. The court distinguished its analy-
sis from the more permissive approach that would have been appropriate if
the companies had entered into a limited venture for research and develop-
ment that left them free to compete in other areas of the railroad track equip-
ment business. Id. at 1426.
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C. DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF THE JOINT VENTURE
ITSELF
1. Distinguishing Per Se Legal Joint Ventures
After a court determines that a cooperative arrangement is
sufficiently integrated to be classified as a joint venture rather
than as a cartel or as a merger, it should then consider the le-
gality of the joint venture itself. In many cases, a court can de-
termine the legality of the joint venture on its face. If the
purpose of the venture is to allow the partners to enter new
markets from which they would have been individually fore-
closed, the venture will be pro-competitive. This type of joint
venture promotes competition by permitting "the introduction
of a new competitor that otherwise might never have come into
being."150 At the same time, such joint ventures have no ad-
verse competitive effects. No actual or potential commercial ri-
valry is eliminated by the formation of joint ventures in
markets in which the partners did not compete, or in the ab-
sence of the joint venture, could not have competed. There is
only one inevitable competitive effect of firms' association in a
joint venture that permits their entry into a new market: the
addition of new capacity that otherwise never would have ex-
isted. Because their only competitive effect is beneficial, such
joint ventures should be deemed per se legal.' 5 '
Courts should uphold many research and development
joint ventures on their face because they allow their partners to
enter new product markets that they could not have entered on
their own.152 Given the obvious barriers to entry into markets
requiring the development of new technology, one would ex-
pect few objections to such an approach. A rule of per se legal-
150. Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1018-19.
151. As one commentator has pointed out: "Joint ventures among firms at
the same level of production that have no such competitive links [as actual or
potential competitors] raise no competitive concerns . . . from an antitrust
standpoint, they are legal." McGrath, supra note 13, 50,470, at 56,137; see also
Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1608-09 (asserting that joint ventures among non-
competitors in unconcentrated markets should be legal per se). Some courts
have recognized that no balancing need be undertaken under the rule of rea-
son when a joint venture has no real anti-competitive effect. For example, on
remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Second Circuit concluded that
"the balancing of pro and anti-competitive effects need not be undertaken be-
cause ... the blanket license has no anti-competitive effect at all." Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers,
620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980).
152. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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ity should not, however, be confined to research and
development joint ventures. The courts should also uphold cer-
tain production joint ventures on their face. The costs of manu-
facturing new products may be just as insurmountable for
individual firms as the costs of developing new technology. In
such cases production joint ventures should be per se legal.1 53
Certain Supreme Court decisions have implicitly recog-
nized the legality of joint ventures that facilitate entry into new
markets. In Associated Press v. United States,'54 the Court did
not question the legality of the venture itself because, according
to one commentator, "few, if any, newspapers would have been
sufficiently affluent to perform the news gathering services
provided by the AP joint venture.' z5  In its per curiam deci-
sion following remand in United States v. Penn-Olin Co.,' 5 6 the
Court upheld the joint venture after the district court found
that neither Pennsalt nor Olin was likely to have entered the
sodium chlorate market in the southeast in the absence of the
joint venture. 57 Similarly, the Court upheld the musical com-
posers' association in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Systems, 158 because none of the composers could have
marketed their music without the blanket license. 59 Finally,
in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 60
the Court did not challenge the legitimacy of the collegiate ath-
letic organization itself because, in its absence, member colleges
153. For example, the joint venture between United Technologies Corp.,
Rolls Royce Ltd. and others for the manufacture of a new jet engine allowed
the parties to produce, at an estimated cost of $600 million, a product that
Rolls Royce did not have the financial capacity to make independently. See
United States Department of Justice Antitrust Guidelines Concerning Re-
search Joint Ventures, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,120, at 20,667-78 (1980)
[hereinafter DOJ Research JV Guidelines]. Similarly, in United States v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld a joint venture among International Business Ma-
chines (IBM), Comsat General Business Communications, Inc. (Comsat), and
Aetna Satellite Communications, Inc. for the production of communications
satellites. Id. at 107. Although the court questioned IBM's inability to enter
the field of satellite communications without Comsat's contribution, id. at 100,
the court relied on the Federal Communications Commission's conclusion that,
because of the risks of new satellite technology and high start-up costs, "Com-
sat and IBM were unlikely both to enter the field separately." Id. at 94.
154. 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
155. Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1057-58.
156. 389 U.S. 308 (1967) (per curiam), aff'g 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965).
157. 246 F. Supp. at 933.
158. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
159. Id. at 19.
160. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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could not have effectively participated in amateur athletics.161
2. The Balancing Test for Joint Ventures Among
Competitors
(a) When Balancing is Appropriate
A rule of per se legality is not appropriate for all joint ven-
tures. Businesses may form joint ventures not only to facilitate
entry into new markets, but also to enhance their collective
power in markets in which they already compete with each
other. This type of joint venture will reduce the number of
competitors in the market because the partners will, in the nat-
ural course, refrain from competing with their own affiliate. 162
The joint venture will, in effect, take the place of its partners
in the relevant market. Whether or not the parties expressly
agree not to compete with the joint venture, they will usually
avoid competition that could harm their own affiliate. Since
this type of joint venture reduces competition and enhances ef-
ficiency, the courts must balance the "tradeoff between effi-
ciency gains... and the potential anti-competitive losses."'' 63
A balancing approach is also appropriate when businesses
form a joint venture in a new market which each partner could
have entered on its own. Such a joint venture will foreclose the
partners' individual entry into the relevant market. By virtue
of the partners' participation in the joint venture, other com-
petitors will no longer perceive them as potential entrants into
the market. In making their decisions on pricing and output,
the incumbent competitors will not feel constrained by the
threat of individual entry by the joint venture partners.164
When the partners to a joint venture could have entered the
relevant market individually, a court should balance the ad-
verse effects resulting from the elimination of their potential
competition against the efficiencies created by the joint
venture.
Thus, the distinction between per se legal joint ventures
and those requiring a balancing approach will often depend
161. I& at 101-02.
162. A joint venture "reduces the parents' incentive for competition be-
cause whatever a parent might earn by making individual sales in the joint
market is now offset by its lowered profit as a partner in the joint venture."
Brodley, supra note 24, at 76.
163. Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 2, at 571.
164. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964), that such adverse consequences could result from a joint ven-
ture's elimination of potential competition. Id- at 173-74.
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upon whether, in the absence of the venture, the parties would
have entered the relevant market on their own. The courts
should be able to determine rather easily whether the joint
venture partners would have been capable of individual entry
into the relevant market.1 65 The costs and risks of entry often
will be evident from the types of products involved. High tech-
nology product markets, for example, are usually more difficult
to enter than commodity product markets because of the requi-
site research and development costs. When the pace of techno-
logical change in the relevant market is swift, the product cycle
will be short, potential returns will be limited and firms will
have more difficulty entering the market on their own. Busi-
nesses' ability to overcome these barriers to entry will be re-
vealed by their financial resources, technical ability, and
experience in producing related products. 66 The courts should
have little difficulty deciding on the basis of such evidence
whether a joint venture facilitates entry into a new market or
simply consolidates the market power of potential competitors
in markets they could have entered on their own.
(b) A Simplified Method of Balancing
Some commentators have argued that, in analyzing agree-
ments among competitors, courts cannot effectively balance po-
tential efficiencies against possible anti-competitive effects.167
In fact, because of the perceived difficulty of a balancing test,
most courts have refused to recognize an efficiency defense in
merger cases.' 68 Following a similar approach, federal courts
165. Some commentators have argued, however, that distinctions based on
"what a firm might have done" are difficult to prove. See Brodley, supra note
20, at 1537; Jeffrey Pfeffer & Phillip Novak, Patterns of Joint Venture Activ-
ity: Implications for Antitrust Policy, 21 ANTITRUST BuLL. 315, 319 (1976).
166. In the Yamaha-Brunswick joint venture, for example, it was clear that
Yamaha was a likely entrant into the American market because of its experi-
ence in marketing the same products in other countries and its established
brand identity, as well as the attractive returns available in the U.S. market.
See Yamaha Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 657 F.2d 971, 978-79 (8th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
167. See Clanton, supra note 96, at 1263; Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 2,
at 578; Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1044.
168. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71
(1963); RSR Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 602 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen-
eral Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 936 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). The DOJ Merger Guidelines, which do
not give efficiencies a high status in merger analysis, provide: "[E]fficiencies
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have failed to factor potential efficiencies into their analysis of
joint ventures among competitors.169
The federal courts' reluctance to consider the efficiencies
of joint ventures is misguided. Since partial integrations among
competitors have a unique ability to generate beneficial eco-
nomic effects, courts should give equal weight to these effects
in the balancing analysis. A court should not prohibit a joint
venture simply because it could have an anti-competitive im-
pact. The FTC recognized the need for a new balancing ap-
proach in its decision approving the General Motors-Toyota
joint venture. In that case, the FTC considered both the poten-
tial efficiencies and the possible anti-competitive effects of the
venture. If anti-competitive effects had been the only consider-
ation, the FTC would certainly have prohibited this joint ven-
ture between the first and third largest automobile
manufacturers in the world. However, the FTC upheld the
joint venture because of its efficiency-enhancing potential
(principally by allowing General Motors to learn Japanese
management and manufacturing methods) and because its rela-
tively small size and short duration indicated that its adverse
competitive impact would be minimal. 170
The FTC's decision on the General Motors-Toyota joint
venture demonstrates that the balancing test for cooperative ar-
rangements among competitors need not be complicated. A
court can often determine the relative efficiencies and adverse
competitive effects of joint ventures without a market analysis.
In most cases, the degree of integration achieved by the joint
venture and the parties' objectives for the joint venture should
dictate whether the balance tips in favor of the legitimacy or
the illegality of the arrangement. These factors will be much
do not constitute a defense to an otherwise anticompetitive merger but are one
of many factors that will be considered by the Department in determining
whether to challenge a merger." DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 21,
13,103, at 20,554.
169. In the Yamaha-Brunswick joint venture case, for example, the Eighth
Circuit focused only on the potential anti-competitive effects of the joint ven-
ture without considering its possible beneficial impact. See Yamaha Motor, 657
F.2d at 976-82.
170. See J. Fred Weston & Stanley I. Ornstein, Eff-iency Considerations
in Joint Ventures, 53 ANTrrRusT L.J. 85, 91 (1984); Discussion of Joint Ven-
ture Hypothetical B, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1197, 1198 (1985) [hereinafter Hypo-
thetical B] (comments by David A. Clanton); Lynn E. Eccleston, Note,
Antitrust Implications of a Joint Venture: Is an Ffficiencies Justification Jus-
tifiable?, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1219, 1219-20, 1238 (1985).
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simpler for the courts to confirm than the complex economic is-
sues raised in a market power analysis.
Under a balancing approach, a court can rather easily pre-
dict the degree of efficiency that a joint venture will generate
by the extent to which the parties have integrated their re-
sources in the venture. As one commentator has pointed out,
"the assumption that higher levels of integration are likely to
be associated with more substantial efficiencies.., is a premise
underlying all of antitrust.' 171 The amount of capital, technol-
ogy, or other assets contributed by the partners will demon-
strate the extent of their commitment to achieve efficiencies
through the joint venture that they could not have achieved on
their own. The pro-competitive effects of a joint venture will
be maximized when the parties integrate their resources to cre-
ate a new competitive entity with capabilities beyond those of
the individual partners. Research and development joint ven-
tures, for example, can achieve technical break-throughs when
partners are willing to assign to the venture all of their rights
to relevant technology. Production joint ventures are most suc-
cessful when the partners contribute a significant amount of
capital to construct efficient new facilities. Conversely, when
partners contribute little to joint ventures, they are more likely
acting for their own competitive benefit rather than to enhance
general economic efficiency. An agreement by purchasers to
pool their bargaining power, or a joint marketing agreement
among competing sellers, unaccompanied by any other efforts
at integration, may enhance the profitability of individual part-
ners, but these arrangements will do little to create substantial
overall efficiencies in the relevant market.
After determining the efficiencies that will be generated by
a joint venture among competitors, the courts must balance
those efficiencies against any potential anti-competitive effects.
In most cases, the anti-competitive effects should be relatively
easy to determine. A joint venture's potential impact on com-
petition may be evident simply from the relationship of the
venture's objectives to the production and marketing phases of
the product cycle. If the venture cannot affect the partners' de-
cisions on pricing and output, it should have minimal anti-com-
171. Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1623. But see FTC Enforcement Policy with
Respect to Physician Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment Plans, 46
Fed. Reg. 48,982 (1981) (applying more lenient standard to less integrated
plans). As certain commentators have recognized: "This perversely encour-
ages greater concentration without demanding the compensating welfare-en-
hancing benefits of integration." Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 2, at 556.
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petitive effects, and no specific analysis of the parties' market
power will be necessary.
The Sherman and Clayton Acts preclude concentrations of
power that would allow firms to restrict output or raise
prices.172 Recognizing this, the Supreme Court concluded in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,173
that a court's principal inquiry under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act should be whether the restraint at issue "facially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output."'174 Since "the potential for
price-fixing and market domination grows as a company moves
closer to the marketplace,"'175 joint ventures removed from the
production and marketing phases of the product cycle should
raise minimal competitive concerns. Joint ventures limited to
research and development, industry standards setting, joint
buying, or other "inputs" into the production process usually do
not affect the partners' decisions on price and output.176 If such
"upstream joint ventures" are integrated enough to produce
substantial efficiencies, the courts should be able to conclude,
without any inquiry into the partners' market power, that those
efficiencies outweigh the ventures' minimal anti-competitive
effects.
Downstream joint ventures involving production or mar-
keting raise greater competitive concerns because they can af-
fect output and pricing in the relevant market.177 Production
joint ventures, for example, give competitors the ability to coor-
dinate their decisions on manufacturing capacity. They also
present an opportunity for collusion on pricing by giving each
partner access to information on the other partners' manufac-
turing costs. Nevertheless, the courts should be able to deter-
mine, without a market power analysis, whether production
joint ventures have a net beneficial effect on competition. A
simple review of the duration and size of a production joint
venture will usually indicate its competitive effect. If a produc-
tion joint venture has a short term, the parties will be acutely
172. See ROBERT BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 17, 20-21 (1978); Alan A.
Fisher et al., Price EZfects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CALiF. L. REv. 777, 785-86
(1989).
173. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
174. Id. at 19-20.
175. Eisen, supra note 28, at 263.
176. See Winslow, supra note 42, at 983-84; Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1040.
177. Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and the Justice Department's Anti-
trust Guide for International Operations, 24 ANTITRUST BuLL. 337, 349 (1979).
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aware that their self-interest lies in maintaining their individ-
ual competitive capacities. 178 They will therefore be less likely
to agree on capacity and output limitations during the term of
the joint venture. Furthermore, if the venture is small in rela-
tion to the rest of the partners' businesses, they will retain
their incentive to compete with each other in the marketing
phase of the business. The partners will be less likely to col-
lude on pricing or other marketing decisions.179 A court should
thus sustain production joint ventures of limited scope and du-
ration regardless of the partners' market power.'80
The net anti-competitive impact of certain joint ventures
may be just as obvious without a consideration of market
power. Certain joint ventures so clearly reduce competition
without any offsetting efficiency benefit that a court can find
the arrangements illegal even if the parties do not possess mar-
ket power.' 8 ' Downstream marketing joint ventures, for exam-
ple, have the greatest potential for facilitating price collusion,
output restrictions, and other anti-competitive effects. In fact,
joint marketing arrangements create an even greater danger of
collusion than cartels because their direct control over all sales
terms "will usually prevent the competitive cheating and half-
hearted compliance which may frustrate a cartel agreement.' ' 8 2
178. See Brodley, supra note 20, at 1547.
179. The General Motors-Toyota joint venture, for example, was limited to
the production of 250,000 automobiles a year. James T. Halverson, Opening
Remarks, National Institute on Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 881, 882
(1985). Since this amount was insignificant in relation to the production capac-
ities of General Motors and Toyota, the parties would have been acting against
their own self-interests if they had stopped competing against each other in
the sale of small cars. Id; see also Kitch, supra note 19, at 961-62; Robert C.
Weinbaum, Antitrust Problems in Conducting the Joint Venture's Business
Activities, 54 ANTrrRUST L.J. 993, 997 (1985); Robert C. Weinbaum, The Gen-
eral Motors-Toyota Joint Venture: A Legally Sound Competitive Strategy, 31
WAYNE L. REV. 1195, 1208 (1985) [hereinafter General Motors-Toyota Joint
Venture].
180. The Justice Department, however, will undoubtedly continue to be
"wary of over inclusive joint ventures involving a large collective market
share." Starling, supra note 3, at 682.
181. The Supreme Court recognized in Federal Trade Commision v. Indi-
ana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), that market power is "but a
surrogate for detrimental effects" and that, in cases where the adverse effects
on competition are obvious, there is no need for a market power analysis. Id.
at 461 (quoting PHILLip E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 1511, at 429 (1986)); see
also Chicago Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 754 F. Supp.
1336, 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding no need for market analysis of the NBA's
requirement that teams limit their appearance on "superstations" to 20 times
per year).
182. Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1039; see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
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If a marketing joint venture is relatively unintegrated, it will
also produce few efficiencies. Without a commitment by the
partners to integrate their financial or marketing resources to
enhance the efficiency of their distribution network, the only
effect of an unintegrated marketing joint venture may be to
raise prices and enhance the partners' profitability. Under a
balancing test, it would be quite simple for a court to conclude,
without any consideration of the partners' market power, that
the anti-competitive potential of an unintegrated marketing
joint venture outweighs its minimal beneficial effects.
In most cases, therefore, a court can conduct a joint ven-
ture balancing test without a specific market power analysis. 83
The degree of integration in a joint venture, the venture's rela-
tionship to the marketing phase of the product cycle, and the
scope and duration of the venture will usually reveal whether
its efficiencies outweigh its anti-competitive effects. In certain
limited situations, however, it will not be clear from these fac-
tors whether the venture's beneficial or adverse effects are pre-
dominant. The courts will then have to engage in market
power analysis to confirm the specific anti-competitive effects
of the venture.
Under the joint venture balancing test, market power defi-
nition will be required only in those rare cases when the poten-
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v. Ivaco, 704 F. Supp. 1409
(W.D. Mich. 1989); Kitch, supra note 19, at 962-93 (discussing Appalachian
Coals and explaining that "most suspect would be joint ventures related to the
current market pricing of the members' products"); Kolasky, supra note 6, at
692-93 (discussing Ivaco).
183. To date, the federal courts have been unable to establish any clear
standards for determining when a market power analysis of horizontal re-
straints is necessary. As the Eleventh Circuit stated, "whether the court...
must weigh the market power of the antitrust defendant is a curiously con-
fused and uncertain area of the law." National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A.,
Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 603 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986). The
Supreme Court itself has been willing to dispense with market power analysis
in certain horizontal restraint cases, while deeming market power a critical is-
sue in others. Compare NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) ("As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market
power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.") with North-
west Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 294-98 (1985) (requiring proof of market power for illegality of collective
refusal to deal). Many federal circuit courts have concluded that market
power should be the central factor in their new structured rule of reason. See
supra note 100. In Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass'n, 439 U.S. 411 (1990), however, the Supreme Court criticized the po-
tential for this trend to introduce "the enormous complexities of market
definition into every price-fixing case." Id. at 430-31 (quoting BORK, supra
note 172, at 269).
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tial competitive benefit and harm of a joint venture are closely
matched. This will occur only when the primary factors in the
balancing test (the degree of integration achieved by the parties
and the objectives of a joint venture) are not decisive and, in
fact, point to opposite results. Among all joint ventures, there
are only two cases in which market power analysis should be
necessary: when the parties have entered into an unintegrated
purchasing joint venture or an integrated marketing joint
venture.
As upstream joint ventures, buying groups usually do not
have significant anti-competitive effects. However, if the buy-
ing groups are not well integrated, they also will not produce
significant efficiencies. If the partners pool only their buying
power and do not combine other assets that can enhance
purchasing efficiency, the joint buying group may have no ben-
eficial effect beyond reducing the partners' costs for raw mater-
ials. Without considering the partners' market power, the
courts cannot determine whether such an effect outweighs the
buying group's adverse impact on competition. Despite their
upstream status, buying groups can have certain adverse ef-
fects. They eliminate competition among their partners in the
purchasing phase and reduce the number of competitive outlets
available to sellers. If the partners have significant market
power, these adverse effects will outweigh the minimal efficien-
cies produced by an unintegrated buying group. However, if
the partners lack market power, any elimination of competition
in the purchasing phase will not be significant. In such cases
unintegrated buying groups may be justified by the manner in
which they allow small purchasers to compete more effectively
against larger competitors.
The efficiencies and adverse competitive effects of inte-
grated marketing joint ventures are also balanced closely
enough to require a specific analysis of the parties' market
power. Downstream marketing organizations can have signifi-
cant anti-competitive effects because they directly affect pricing
and output in the relevant market. However, if they are well
integrated, these joint ventures can also produce substantial
benefits, such as more efficient marketing services for custom-
ers. In the absence of a market analysis, a court will be unable
to determine whether it should prohibit integrated marketing
joint ventures. If the partners do not have market power, the
benefits of such a joint venture may outweigh the elimination
of competition among the partners in the marketing phase.
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In cases involving either unintegrated joint buying groups
or integrated marketing joint ventures, the courts should estab-
lish the share of a particular market that will be deemed to cre-
ate market power among the joint venture partners. A clear
standard would simplify the courts' analysis considerably. The
courts should recognize a "safe harbor" of legality for any ven-
tures whose partners have market shares below a particular
threshold.'14 Since the courts have, until recently, analyzed
horizontal restraints only under a per se approach, they have
not had an opportunity to define a safe harbor for these re-
straints. The courts have, however, had significant experience
with a rule of reason analysis of vertical restraints and, in the
vertical area, "appear to be converging on a definition of safe
harbor for firms with less than 20-25% market share in a rele-
vant market."'1 5 The Department of Justice has defined a safe
harbor for mergers in cases where the post-merger "concentra-
tion ratio" is less than 1000 on the Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex. This ratio corresponds to approximately a fifty percent
market share for the four largest firms in the relevant mar-
ket. 8 6 In light of the unique competitive advantages of joint
ventures, the market share safe harbor for these arrangements
should be higher than for vertical restraints or for mergers.
The courts could easily justify a safe harbor for unintegrated
buying groups or integrated marketing joint ventures in which
partners possess a collective market share of less than thirty-
184. A few federal courts have held that joint ventures among firms that
lack market power cannot be deemed illegal. See Rothery Storage & Van Co.,
v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C.Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1033 (1987); see also National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., 779 F.2d 592, 604
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986). Commentators advocating modifi-
cation of the United States antitrust laws have noted that both the European
Economic Community and Japan allow safe harbor exemptions for joint ven-
tures among firms that lack significant market power. See, e.g., Jorde, supra
note 3, at 525.
185. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and An-
titrust, HIGH TEcH. L.J. 1, 45 (1989); see Eisen, supra note 28, at 260. The ver-
tical restraint cases defining a market share threshold include Assam Drug Co.
v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 318 n.18 (8th Cir. 1986); O.S.C. Corp. v.
Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1291 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792
F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483
F. Supp. 750, 761 (D. Md.), aff'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 454
U.S. 864 (1981); see also Ryco Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231-32 &
n.14 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988); Hand v. Central Transp.,
Inc., 779 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1985); Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717
F.2d 1560, 1568 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1983).
186. See DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, % 13,103, at 20,552-53.
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five percent. 187
Defendants should have the burden of proving the legality
of joint ventures under the balancing approach proposed in this
Article. The joint venture partners have access to the docu-
ments and witnesses that can prove the extent to which they
have integrated their resources, the objectives of their venture,
its size and scope of operation and, if necessary, their collective
market share."8 Partners should be able to document, in ad-
vance, their legitimate objectives for a joint venture. There
should be abundant evidence of the parties' competitive pur-
pose in the internal discussions and negotiations preceding the
formation of a joint venture and in the legal documents estab-
lishing the venture. The partners' failure to come forward with
evidence of the venture's efficiency-enhancing objectives may
indicate that their real purpose was to eliminate competition
among themselves.
D. APPLYING THE PROPOSED STANDARD TO SPECIFIC JOINT
VENTURES
A review of the competitive characteristics of specific types
of joint ventures reveals how easily a court can apply the anti-
trust standard proposed in this Article. In many cases, it will
be clear that a joint venture permits its partners to enter new
markets and that the venture should therefore be legal on its
face. Even when competitors form joint ventures in current
markets or in new markets that each could have entered indi-
vidually, the balancing of efficiencies and adverse competitive
effects should not be difficult. In most cases, a court can avoid
a complicated market analysis. It should thus be clear to busi-
187. Some commentators have recognized that the safe harbor threshold
for joint ventures should be higher than for mergers because such arrange-
ments are significantly less anti-competitive than mergers. See Kitch, supra
note 19, at 961 n.10. Other commentators have argued, however, that the mar-
ket share thresholds for joint ventures and mergers should be the same. See
BORK, supra note 172, at 278; Jorde, supra note 3, at 523; see also Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984) (30% market share did not
constitute market power in a tying case).
188. One commentator has advocated placing the burden of proving the le-
gitimacy of a joint venture on the defendant because "the defendants are in
the best position to demonstrate whether efficiencies are in fact present."
Brodley, supra note 24, at 79; see also Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litiga-
tion by 'Facial Examination' of Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se-
Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984) (stating that defend-
ant should rebut or raise defenses once plaintiff proves existence of a restraint
meriting application of per se rule).
[Vol. 76:1
JOINT VENTURES
nesses and practitioners what types of joint ventures a court
will accept and which it will prohibit. This approach will en-
courage firms to enter into pro-competitive cooperative ar-
rangements and deter them from forming joint ventures that
unduly limit competition.
1. Research and Development Ventures
Under the standard proposed in this Article, courts should
almost always uphold joint ventures for the research and devel-
opment of new products because they create significant effi-
ciencies while causing minimal anti-competitive effects. In fact,
in many cases a court should deem these ventures legal on
their face. The barriers to entry into high technology markets
are now extremely high. By sharing risks in a research and de-
velopment joint venture, small and medium-sized firms can
enter high technology markets from which they would have
been individually foreclosed. The integration of complemen-
tary technologies in a joint venture will often facilitate techni-
cal break-throughs that the parties could not have achieved on
their own. Research and development joint ventures that are
firms' sole means of entering new technology markets can only
have a pro-competitive effect. A court should, therefore, up-
hold these arrangements without any balancing of their benefi-
cial and adverse market effects.
When the partners to a research and development joint
venture possess sufficient resources to enter a new technology
market on their own, the venture will eliminate some competi-
tion in the research and development phase of the product cy-
cle. Absent the joint venture, the partners could have
competed against each other in the development of the relevant
technology. A court should balance the harm from this elimi-
nation of competition against the efficiencies that will result
from the venture. It should be clear in most cases, however,
that the efficiencies of research and development joint ventures
outweigh their adverse effects on competition.
The efficiencies resulting from most research and develop-
ment joint ventures are significant. By integrating their techni-
cal and capital resources, the partners are able to avoid waste
and duplication in the research phase of the product cycle and
speed the development of new products. Research and develop-
ment joint ventures also encourage firms to invest in new tech-
nologies. Businesses are often deterred from investing in
research and development by the fear that competitors will
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copy and use the results without compensating the originating
firms for their up-front risks. Joint ventures can eliminate con-
cerns about "free riders" by requiring competitors to invest in
the venture before using the fruits of its research. The joint
venture can also establish conditions for the licensing or disclo-
sure of its technology to competitors, including the payment of
royalties to compensate partners for their original investments.
Since joint venture partners can be assured that all who benefit
from the technology will share in its costs, they will be more
willing to bear the initial risks of research and development. 8 9
The anti-competitive effects of most research and develop-
ment joint ventures are minimal. These arrangements are
more accurately characterized as a means of "pre-competitive
cooperation" than as a device for collusion. °9 0 Given their posi-
tion at the initial phase of the product cycle, research and de-
velopment joint ventures usually do not afford their partners
the opportunity to limit downstream competition among them-
selves. The objective of most research and development joint
ventures is to increase rather than restrict the output of new
products in the relevant market. Any reduction in research
and development competition that these types of joint ventures
may cause should usually be offset by increased competition in
the eventual production and sale of new products 9 1 In cer-
tain unusual cases, however, the parties may have an anti-com-
petitive purpose for a research and development joint venture
that tips the balance in favor of the venture's illegality. The
courts should, for example, prohibit research and development
joint ventures formed for the purpose of delaying rather than
facilitating the introduction of a new product or technology. 9 2
189. McGrath, supra note 13, 1 50,470, at 56,139; Rule, supra note 120, at
1131-32; Winslow, supra note 42, at 985.
190. Main, supra note 5, at 126. The Department of Justice and some com-
mentators have claimed, however, that research and development joint ven-
tures can be illegal when one large research project is substituted for several
smaller projects that could have existed in the absence of the joint venture.
See DOJ Research JV Guidelines, supra note 153, 13,120, at 20,662-63; Wil-
liam J. Murphy, Interfirm Cooperation in a Competitive Economic System, 26
AM. Bus. L.J. 29, 46 (1988); Brodley, supra note 20, at 1571.
191. J. Patrick Ovington, Note, Mitigating Antitrust Sanctions for Re-
search and Development Joint Ventures, 4 PACE L. REV. 497, 513-14 (1984).
192. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), the Second Circuit disapproved a joint
venture under which Kodak agreed with two potential competitors (Sylvania
Electric Products, Inc. and General Electric) to delay the development of im-
proved flashcubes until Kodak began to market a matching camera. Id. at 304.
Similarly, in United States v. Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n, 1969 Trade
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2. Essential Industry-Wide Organizations
Much confusion exists concerning the legality of industry-
wide joint ventures designed to set product standards, collect
and disseminate critical data, regulate competition, or provide
other essential facilities to competitors in a particular market.
The courts have failed to distinguish in such cases between the
legitimacy of the joint venture itself and the legality of related
restrictions on third parties' access to the venture.193 The rele-
vant issue in many cases involving essential facilities is not
whether the joint venture itself is legal, but whether the par-
ties have entered into restraints ancillary to the venture that
unnecessarily restrict competition. Although related restric-
tions may be too broad in certain cases, courts should uphold
the ventures themselves on their face if they allow the mem-
bers of an industry to provide a valuable product or service that
otherwise could never have existed. 94 Under the approach
proposed in this Article, a court would consider the legality of
ancillary restraints separately from the legality of the joint
venture. A court could then remedy any anti-competitive ef-
fects without condemning the legitimate activities of the joint
venture itself.
3. Joint Purchasing Organizations
Joint buying groups present more difficult antitrust issues
than research and development joint ventures or essential in-
dustry-wide organizations. Joint purchasing organizations are
usually composed of competitors who pool their buying power
in order to obtain a more favorable price for a common raw ma-
terial or a finished product purchased for resale. 195 Although
Cas. (CCH) 72,907, at 87,456 (C.D. Cal. 1969), the court prohibited four auto-
mobile manufacturers and their trade association from conspiring to delay the
development of pollution control devices for automobiles. Id. at 87,457.
193. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1944) (news-
papers enjoined from participating in AP activities); Radiant Burners v. Peo-
ples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 (1961) (illegality of trade
association's tests and seal of approval for gas burners).
194. In Associated Press, for example, the Associated Press made possible a
worldwide news gathering service that individual newspapers could not have
developed on their own. 326 U.S. at 4. Similarly, industry-wide standards,
such as a "seal of approval" for gas burners that meet certain operating stan-
dards, could not be established without a cooperative effort among many com-
petitors. Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 658-59.
195. For example, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Sta-
tionery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), the Court recognized that a
purchasing cooperative among retailers allowed them to obtain reduced prices
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these organizations may make the parties more effective com-
petitors in their current markets, they do not facilitate entry
into new markets. Joint purchasing organizations may elimi-
nate competition among their partners for essential products or
services and reduce the number of competitive outlets available
to suppliers. A court should weigh these adverse competitive
effects against the efficiencies created by joint buying groups.
The balance between beneficial and adverse competitive effects
is much closer for these organizations than for research and de-
velopment joint ventures or essential industry-wide organiza-
tions. In certain cases the courts should consider additional
factors, such as the degree of integration achieved by a joint
buying group and the market power of the participants, before
determining the legality of these arrangements.
Cooperative buying arrangements which are not suffi-
ciently integrated should not qualify for joint venture analysis
at all. For example, the courts have appropriately applied a per
se analysis to unintegrated buying groups whose purpose was to
establish a uniform price for their partners' products. In
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.19 6 a group of major oil
companies agreed to stabilize market prices for their own
brands of gasoline by purchasing surplus gasoline from in-
dependent refiners.197 There was no integration of resources
among the parties other than their agreement to buy the sur-
plus gasoline. Despite the defendants' arguments that the
agreement was necessary to avoid cut-throat competition, the
Court characterized the arrangement as a naked cartel and ap-
plied the per se rule.1 98 Similarly, in United States v. Capitol
Service,199 the court found per se illegal an agreement among
competing movie theaters not to submit competitive bids for
motion picture rentals.20 0 Since the defendants in these cases
had not coordinated their efforts to advance any legitimate effi-
ciency objectives, the courts rightfully condemned the buying
groups on their face.
If the parties to a joint buying group have integrated their
for stationery and thereby compete more effectively against larger firms. Id
at 286-87. Many smaller hospitals, in an effort to remain competitive, have re-
cently begun to form group buying organizations for the purchase of medical
supplies at a reduced cost. See Joseph, supra note 26, at 633.
196. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
197. Id. at 173.
198. Id. at 219-24.
199. 568 F.Supp. 134 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985).
200. Id- at 148-54.
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efforts to enhance their competitiveness, however, their cooper-
ative arrangement should qualify for the joint venture balanc-
ing test. In such a case, a court can use the degree of
integration achieved by the buying group as a measure of its ef-
ficiency. In addition to pooling market power, the members of
a joint buying group may integrate their resources in other
ways that allow them to provide better services to customers.
These measures may include joint warehousing, computerized
ordering services, shared transportation, and other means of
making inventory more readily available.20 1 Buying groups
that are so well integrated should be sustained rather easily
under the balancing approach. They provide substantial effi-
ciencies and cause minimal anti-competitive effects because
they are removed from the production and marketing phases of
the product cycle.
The more typical joint buying group, however, involves no
more integration than a pooling of the parties' buying power.
Many buying groups simply collect orders and submit group
bids on behalf of their members. Better price concessions are
the only efficiencies that result from these arrangements. In
these cases the courts should consider the market shares of the
joint venture partners. If the partners already have significant
market power, the adverse effects of the arrangement will out-
weigh its efficiencies. However, if the partners are small firms
that individually lack market power, the arrangement will not
have a significant anti-competitive effect. Furthermore, in such
a case a buying group may allow small firms to compete more
effectively against their larger competitors.20 2 Group buying or-
ganizations among small firms may therefore be valid even if
their only integration involves a pooling of the firms' buying
power. The courts should not prohibit legitimate joint buying
groups whose members have individual market shares of ten
percent or less and a collective market share below thirty-five
percent.20 3 For legitimate joint buying groups that exceed the
201. The Northwest Wholesale Court, for example, pointed out that the
purchasing cooperative allowed "participating retailers to achieve economies of
scale in both the purchase and warehousing of wholesale supplies, and also en-
sured ready access to a stock of goods that might otherwise be unavailable on
short notice." 472 U.S. at 286-87.
202. As the Court stated in Northwest W7holesale, these groups "increase
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive."
472 U.S. at 295 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979)).
203. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. But see LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 293-94 (1977) (stating that
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collective market share threshold, an appropriate remedy may
be to limit the number of participants rather than to preclude
the joint venture entirely.20 4
4. Production Joint Ventures
The costs and risks of manufacturing certain new products
are so great today that some firms could not hope to produce
the products without forming joint ventures with their compet-
itors. A production joint venture may therefore be just as nec-
essary as a research and development venture to bring a new
product to market.205 Courts should uphold production joint
ventures on their face whenever they allow their partners to
produce a new product that they could not have produced on
their own. The recently proposed U.S. Memories consortium,
for example, would have allowed firms to invest the $500 mil-
lion to $1 billion required to develop and manufacture advanced
dynamic random access memories ("DRAMs") for the com-
puter industry.20 6 The only possible competitive effect of the
joint venture would have been an expansion of competition and
potential output in the domestic DRAM market. Similarly, re-
cent "teaming agreements" among government contractors
have allowed the contractors to manufacture new military
products that they could not have produced individually.20 7
buying agency among firms with collective market share of 10% should be
illegal).
204. See Brodley, supra note 20, at 1570.
205. Jorde, supra note 3, at 520-21. This argument has been made by those
seeking to extend the statutory protection of the National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984 from research and development to production joint ven-
tures. Kolasky, supra note 6, at 694. As support for this argument one
commentator has noted that the EEC has granted an antitrust exemption to
joint ventures that use the results of research and development in the produc-
tion phase. Zwart, supra note 108, at 68.
206. Jorde & Teece, supra note 3, at 553. The production joint venture be-
tween Pennsalt and Olin at issue in United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964), should also have been treated permissively because it allowed the
two companies to enter a new market in the southeastern United States that
they would not have entered individually. See Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1053.
207. Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1061-62. Under a teaming agreement, two
or more companies form a joint venture to act as a potential prime contractor,
or a potential prime contractor agrees to have one or more companies act as
subcontractors, under a government contract or acquisition program. IHL at
1059 n.2 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 9.601 (1988)). For an example of a teaming agree-
ment, see Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1037
(9th Cir. 1983) (teaming agreement between Northrop and McDonnell Douglas
for production of new military aircraft). Other teaming agreements have been
formed to develop a new semiconductor for military use, the Tomahawk cruise
missile, a new long distance telephone network for the federal government,
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These joint ventures have helped overcome the high barriers to
entry caused by the complexity of modern weapons programs
and government requirements that contractors assume a
greater share of the costs and risks of the programs. Since such
joint ventures result in the production of a new product that,
but for the integration of the parties' resources, could not have
been produced, they should be upheld without any considera-
tion of their impact on competition in the relevant market.208
If, however, the parties form a production joint venture in
an existing market or in a new market that the parties could
have entered on their own, a court should weigh the efficien-
cies of the venture against the reduction of competition that
will inevitably occur. By joining their production capacities in
these markets, the parties eliminate competition that would
otherwise exist in the manufacturing phase of the product cy-
cle. The parties will no longer compete in the purchase of raw
materials, development of manufacturing technology, or opera-
tion of production facilities. Furthermore, the parties' associa-
tion in the production phase may give them a mutual interest
in limiting output or raising prices in the marketing phase.
Before upholding a production joint venture among actual or
potential competitors, the courts should balance the potential
anti-competitive effects against the efficiencies created by the
joint venture.
Under a balancing approach, the courts should recognize
that production joint ventures may create substantial efficien-
cies. A significant integration of the partners' resources occurs
through a pooling of capital, assets, production technology, and
the shared risks of operating a manufacturing facility. This in-
tegration creates economies of scale, eliminates duplication of
effort, and facilitates the type of risk-sharing that encourages
firms to invest in modem capital facilities.
and computers for air traffic control. See Hibner, supra note 22, at 711;
Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1059-61.
208. See Hibner, supra note 22, at 714; Hypothetical A, supra note 120, at
1169 (comments by Don T. Hibner, Jr.). The Department of Justice currently
appears to take a benign view toward production joint ventures that allow
their partners to enter new markets. See McGrath, supra note 13, 1 50,470, at
56,140 ("We will also recognize that when a venture adds new, state-of-the-art
capacity in the market where the parents operate, it may promote a pro-com-
petitive output expansion."). Indeed, the Department recently terminated its
investigation of a joint venture among HBO, CBS and Columbia Pictures to
produce programming for cable television. Id at 56,141. The Department's de-
cision was based in part on the fact that CBS and Columbia "did not possess
unique capabilities to enter the [pay television] market." Id
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When businesses form production joint ventures in order
to invest in new manufacturing facilities, the efficiencies of the
arrangement should usually outweigh the potential anti-com-
petitive effects. A court can often confirm the legality of such a
joint venture simply by reviewing its scope. Capacity-enhanc-
ing production joint ventures should raise little antitrust con-
cern if they are confined to the manufacturing phase, are of
limited size, and continue for only a specified period of time.
Because they do not encompass the marketing phase, joint ven-
tures whose scope is limited to the construction and operation
of new manufacturing facilities have less of an anti-competitive
effect than mergers.20 9 Capacity-enhancing joint ventures
should not adversely affect prices or output in the joint venture
market if the partners retain their individual rights to profit
from the marketing phase.210 Since the partners' ultimate re-
turn will be determined by their individual marketing efforts,
the partners will continue to compete on resale prices and will
have an incentive to increase the joint venture's output avail-
able to each of them for resale.21' The partners' incentive to
continue competing with each other in the marketing phase
will be even greater if a production joint venture is relatively
small or limited in duration.212 Under the balancing test, courts
should therefore easily sustain production joint ventures with a
limited scope or term when their purpose is to add new manu-
facturing capacity.
Production joint ventures of broader scope will have more
difficulty passing muster under the balancing test. Production
joint ventures with no definite termination date are more likely
to create a long-term mutuality of interests among their part-
ners that encourages collusion on pricing and output. If the
209. The Department of Justice approved the Alcan-Arco joint venture for
the production of aluminum as a less restrictive alternative to the complete
merger of the aluminum production businesses of the two companies. United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,427 (W.D. Ky.
1985).
210. Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1049.
211. The output-enhancing capacity of a production joint venture will be
furthered if each partner has the unilateral right to finance facility expansions
which it desires. Brodley, supra note 20, at 1550; Hypothetical B, supra note
170, at 1206-07 (comments by James F. Ril).
212. The FTC, for example, concluded that a production joint venture be-
tween General Motors and Toyota would not adversely affect competition
since the arrangement was limited to a term of twelve years and the produc-
tion of only 250,000 cars a year. See In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C.
374, 383-84 (1984); see also Weinbaum, General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture,
supra note 179, at 1197; Winslow, supra note 42, at 983.
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joint venture is as large as or larger than the partners' in-
dependent operations, the partners may have a greater incen-
tive to collude on pricing and output decisions affecting those
operations. The courts may therefore be justified in prohibiting
certain large production joint ventures of unlimited duration.2 13
The balance may also shift in favor of the illegality of a
production joint venture when the parties' purpose is to elimi-
nate manufacturing capacity. Since these joint ventures reduce
output, their beneficial and adverse competitive effects will be
more closely balanced than for joint ventures designed to ex-
pand capacity. The anti-competitive effects of these joint ven-
tures can be significant, for in limiting output, they indirectly
raise prices in the relevant market.
In certain industries, however, a reduction in capacity by a
joint venture can lead to greater efficiency. The costs of closing
inefficient and outdated facilities may be prohibitive for indi-
vidual firms. Joint ventures allow firms to share the costs of
employee severance, pension plan terminations, environmental
clean-up and other liabilities that arise when old manufacturing
facilities are closed. After eliminating outdated plants, these
joint ventures may have sufficient remaining capital to modern-
ize the partners' other facilities. Joint ventures can therefore
be an efficient means of rationalizing supply and demand in in-
dustries suffering from over-capacity. In the tire industry, "15
to 20 percent of the worldwide tire making capacity needs to be
shut down before supply and demand come into line."2 14 Joint
ventures in basic industries such as steel, aluminum and rubber
might allow American companies "to close ... weak facilities,
invest in . . . strong ones, and keep production alive in the
United States. '2 15 Joint ventures which combine production fa-
cilities but leave the partners free to market their products sep-
arately would certainly be preferable to the large mergers that
have occurred in basic American industries in the 1980s.216 Be-
213. In Yamaha Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commision, 657 F.2d 971 (8th
Cir. 1981), the indefinite length of the joint venture was one of the factors that
helped convince the Eighth Circuit to preclude Yamaha and Brunswick from
jointly producing outboard motors. I& at 979-80; see also Citizens' Publishing
v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 141 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that
if an operating agreement between two newspapers continued indefinitely, it
would have to be analyzed like a merger).
214. Jonathan P. Hicks, Chasing Few Buyers with Too Many Tires, N.Y.
TIMEs, February 3, 1991, at F5.
215. See Millstein, supra note 122, at 722; see also Hypothetical B, supra
note 170, at 1202, 1206-07 (comments by Rill).
216. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., for example, is the only major tire man-
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cause joint ventures would be a less anti-competitive way to
bring supply and demand into balance in industries plagued by
chronic excess capacity, the courts should be more willing to
uphold capacity-reducing production joint ventures under these
circumstances. 217
5. Joint Marketing Organizations
Marketing joint ventures raise the greatest anti-competi-
tive risk of all because they limit competition in the critical ar-
eas of pricing and output, which have long been the primary
concern of the Sherman Act. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society21 8 and Federal
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,2 19 in the
absence of a real integration of resources, courts should deem
joint marketing arrangements among competitors per se illegal
because they deprive customers of choice in prices, products
and services. 220
However, joint marketing organizations that involve a true
integration of their partners' resources can contribute to eco-
nomic efficiency in much the same way as mergers. Joint ven-
tures are a less restrictive means for competitors to enhance
their marketing services to customers by combining their com-
plementary marketing and financial strengths, sales forces and
product lines. In certain unusual cases the integration of part-
ners' resources in a joint marketing effort can even make avail-
able a new product that the partners could not have sold on
their own. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.,221 for example, the individual composers created a
blanket license that could not have existed in the absence of
ufacturer that did not merge with a competitor in the 1980s. See Hicks, supra
note 214, at F5.
217. But see National Institute on Joint Ventures, Questions and Answers
to Applying Joint Venture Antitrust Principles-A Practical Guide, 54 ANTI-
TRUST L. J. 1021, 1024-25 (1985) [hereinafter Principles: Questions and An-
swers] (comments by J. Paul McGrath) (stating that agreement among
competitors to cut back on capacity raises serious antitrust questions).
218. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
219. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
220. See, e.g., Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356-57; Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. at 459; Compact v. Nashville, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1569 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
An exception to this rule would be marketing joint ventures organized solely
for export sales, which are exempted from the antitrust laws under the Webb-
Pomerene Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1397 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 61-66 (1988)), and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1988)).
221. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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the cooperative arrangement. 222 Whenever a marketing joint
venture allows the parties to enter a new market they could
not have entered on their own, the venture's net competitive
effect can only be beneficial and a court should uphold the ven-
ture on its face.
In most cases, however, competitors enter into joint mar-
keting arrangements for current products. Because these ar-
rangements directly restrict competition among their partners,
courts should balance their anti-competitive effects against
their efficiencies. If a marketing joint venture is not well inte-
grated, it will usually be clear, without any consideration of the
market power of the participants, that the anti-competitive ef-
fects of such a downstream collaboration outweigh its efficien-
cies. Without a substantial combination of the partners'
marketing resources, the only "efficiency" resulting from a
pooling of marketing power in a joint venture will be enhanced
profits for the partners.223
In certain joint ventures the parties may integrate their
marketing resources in a way that substantially enhances cus-
tomer services. For example, by accessing their competitors'
products, sales force, distributors, or financial resources, small
firms may be able to provide their customers with advertising,
product explanations, warranties, delivery methods, and other
services that they could not have provided on their own.224 Be-
cause such integrated arrangements create substantial efficien-
cies, courts should permit them when the partners do not have
significant market power. In such cases the anti-competitive ef-
222. The Court stated: "The blanket license is composed of the individual
compositions plus the aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater
than the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different product." Id. at 20-
21.
223. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S.
85 (1984), the Court concluded that when major competitors enter into an
unintegrated joint selling arrangement in an existing market, "one can hardly
imagine a pro-competitive justification actually probable in fact or strong
enough in principle to make [the] joint selling arrangement 'reasonable' under
the Sherman Act." Id. at 109-10 n.39.
224. Although the setting of common prices by joint advertising has been
deemed per se illegal by some courts, see, e.g., United States v. Serta Assoc.,
296 F. Supp. 1121, 1125-26 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem, 393 U.S. 534 (1969);
United States v. Pittsburgh Area Pontiac Dealers, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 62,233, at 75,492 (W.D. Pa. 1978), joint ventures which allow small re-
tailers to conduct advertising that they could not otherwise have afforded
should be upheld because they increase competition. See Richard W. Pogue,
Antitrust Considerations in Fonning a Joint Venture, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,
940 (1985).
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fects of the joint venture should not be substantial enough to
outweigh its efficiencies. In fact, because the partners may still
compete in the production and development phase of the prod-
uct cycle, integrated marketing joint ventures have less of an
anti-competitive effect than a complete merger of the partners'
operations. Thus, in some cases the courts could justify uphold-
ing well integrated marketing joint ventures whose partners
had market shares somewhat in excess of those currently
deemed acceptable by the Department of Justice for
mergers.225
III. RESTRAINTS ANCILLARY TO JOINT VENTURES
A. A STANDARD FOR ANALYZING ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
Once a court determines whether a joint venture itself is
acceptable under the antitrust laws, it should then consider the
legality of any related restrictions on competition among the
joint venture partners. Often the anti-competitive effects of a
joint venture result not from the parties' agreement to associ-
ate in a cooperative undertaking, but from their attempt to re-
strict competition in ways unrelated to the venture's primary
objectives. A research and development joint venture may, for
example, exceed its legitimate objectives by requiring its part-
ners to refrain from competing with each other in the ultimate
production and sale of products developed by the venture. The
courts should analyze such ancillary restraints separately to
confirm that they are not broader than necessary for accom-
plishing the legitimate purposes of the joint venture.226
225. In unusual cases in which a distressed industry can be made more effi-
cient through an integrated marketing joint venture, the courts should con-
sider establishing a market share safe harbor that is considerably higher than
that applicable to a merger. In Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S.
344 (1933), for example, the Supreme Court appropriately upheld a joint sales
agency among 132 coal companies in the Appalachian region. Id at 378. The
defendants argued that the purpose of the sales agency was to increase the sale
of Appalachian coal through better methods of distribution and advertising.
Id at 359. The Court emphasized certain unique factors affecting the Appa-
lachian coal industry that justified the arrangement, including the companies'
weak competitive position against large buying organizations and the over-ca-
pacity and bankruptcies in the industry. Id. at 361-64.
226. In some cases, however, restrictions on price and output are so inte-
gral to the joint venture that they cannot be analyzed separately. In Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), for example,
the price-fixing accomplished by the blanket license was the distinguishing
feature of the integration among the copyright owners. I&L at 5-6; see also
Liebeler, supra note 85, at 1031. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the maximum fee schedule was the essence of the
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Judge Taft's 1898 decision in United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. 227 serves as the theoretical basis for ancillary
restraints analysis. After little use for several decades, Judge
Taft's approach has, in the last ten years, been rediscovered.228
Addyston Pipe requires the courts to uphold any competitive
restraints that are "subordinate and collateral to a separate, le-
gitimate transaction. '229 Thus, if the primary transaction is
proper, a court should allow any related restraints essential to
the transaction. 230 By the same token, restraints among com-
petitors that are broader than required for the legitimate pur-
poses of a transaction should be void.231  Such "naked"
restraints cannot be justified by the legitimacy of the transac-
tion itself. A court should analyze these restraints as if the
transaction did not exist. Thus, overly broad horizontal restric-
tions on price or output should not escape illegality simply be-
cause the parties happen to have entered into a legitimate joint
venture.2
32
cooperative arrangement among the physicians. Id. at 335-36. In Federal
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), the
refusal to supply X-rays to insurance companies characterized the arrange-
ment among the dentists. Id. at 448. In such cases, where the restriction on
competition is the essence of the joint arrangement at issue, the legality of the
venture itself cannot be separated from the legitimacy of the competitive re-
straint. If the arrangement itself is illegal, the restraint must as a consequence
be condemned.
227. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
228. See supra note 18; see also BORK, supra note 172, at 27.
229. BORK, supra note 172, at 27.
230. Professor Liebeler has stated: "Restraints that facilitate a contract's
main purpose and that are not broader than reasonably necessary are to be
judged on the same basis as the contract itself. If the contract is legal, so is the
ancillary restraint, no matter what form either the contract or its ancillary re-
straint might take." Liebeler, supra note 85, at 1029. The Department of Jus-
tice has adopted a similar definition of restraints ancillary to joint ventures.
See DOJ International Guidelines, supra note 35, 13,109.10, at 20593, 20599-
60.
231. See 85 F. at 282-83.
232. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S.
85 (1984), for example, the Court properly held the restrictions on the televis-
ing of college football games to be illegal because they were not necessary to
achieve the NCAA's purpose of promoting collegiate athletics. Id. at 120; see
also Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 1991-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,308, at 65,153 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (NBA's restriction on
number of times teams could appear on superstation held to be an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade). Some commentators have argued that the Court's deci-
sion in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 557 U.S. 332 (1982) can be
viewed not as condemning the joint venture among the dentists but as finding
their maximum fee schedule to be an unjustifiably broad related restriction.
See Liebeler, supra note 85, at 1048; Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 2, at 568.
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The antitrust analysis of ancillary restraints on competition
should be relatively straight-forward. The legality of the re-
straints should depend upon the parties' competitive purpose
and not on complicated issues of market power and structure.
Any related competitive restrictions that are necessary for the
legitimate purposes of a joint venture should be per se legal.
Regardless of the parties' market power, they should be al-
lowed to implement restraints on competition that are neces-
sary to insure the effectiveness of their cooperative
arrangement. On the other hand, a court should deem per se
illegal any horizontal restrictions on price or output that are
broader than necessary to accomplish the purposes of a joint
venture. Even if the parties have a small market share, they
should not be permitted to restrain competition outside the
proper bounds of their joint venture.233
In determining whether to uphold particular restraints as
ancillary to joint ventures, the courts should be guided by the
competitive purpose of the joint venture itself. Judge Taft rec-
ognized in Addyston Pipe that the purpose of the main transac-
tion "suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes
a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of such
restraints may be judicially determined. 234 An effective stan-
dard of legality would be whether an ancillary restraint is "rea-
sonably necessary" to accomplish the purposes of the joint
venture.2 35 Such a test would allow the courts to confirm that
the partners had used their reasonable business judgment in
adopting legitimate competitive restrictions. It would not per-
mit the courts to second-guess business decisions made in good
faith. A restraint would be acceptable under this standard even
if it was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the
joint venture's purpose. The fact that a court could conceive of
233. As the Supreme Court stated in NCAA, "the absence of proof of mar-
ket power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output." 468 U.S. at
109.
234. 85 F. at 282. The DOJ Research JV Guidelines, which take a similar
approach, state: "The legality of collateral restraints is largely a function of
the proximity of their relationship to the essential purposes of the joint re-
search venture ....." DOJ Research JV Guidelines, supra note 153, 13,120, at
20,656.
235. See Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 2, at 575. The Court implied such
a standard for the analysis of ancillary restraints in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), when it stated, "[W]e
would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably necessary to effec-
tuate the rights that are granted would be deemed a per se violation of the
Sherman Act." Id at 19.
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a less restrictive means of achieving the partners' objectives
would not mean that the partners had acted for anti-competi-
tive purposes.2 36 However, in cases where the parties intention-
ally disregarded less restrictive alternatives in favor of more
anti-competitive restraints a court might conclude that the par-
ties' real objective was to eliminate competition rather than to
enhance efficiency.237
The courts can most effectively determine the legality of
ancillary restraints by considering how central their purposes
are to the objectives of a joint venture. Courts should usually
uphold restraints which establish internal procedures to insure
the efficient functioning of the venture. For example, many
joint ventures cannot operate effectively without reasonable
membership criteria and provisions for the exchange of infor-
mation among their partners. Restraints that preclude free-rid-
ing on the fruits of the joint venture may be just as necessary
to the operation of the venture. Partners may be reluctant to
contribute capital, technology, or other assets to a joint venture
unless they can be assured that third parties will not be able to
use these resources for their own benefit. Restrictions on ac-
cess to the joint venture, including limitations on the number
of partners and on the disclosure or licensing of joint venture
236. In some older cases the courts adopted a "least restrictive alternative"
standard for judging the legality of restraints under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
See, e.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 942-43 (5th Cir.
1975); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert de-
nied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 1049, 1064-66 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The more recent trend, however, has
been to reject such a strict standard. See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that business people would
"be made guarantors that the imaginations of lawyers could not conjure up
some method of achieving the business purpose in question that would result
in a somewhat lesser restriction of trade"); see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980); National Bancard Corp. v. VISA, U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1256-57
(S.D. Fla. 1984) ("It should be stressed... that... the relevant question is not
whether the challenged practice is the most competitive device that can be
imagined or the 'least restrictive,' but simply whether it is reasonable."), aff'd,
779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986). Most commentators
have criticized the "least restrictive alternative" approach for placing too great
a burden on defendants to justify legitimate business decisions. See, e.g., Salem
M. Katsh, Collateral Restraints in Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003,
1005-06 (1985); Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 2, at 574-75; Pitofsky, supra
note 1, at 1620. The Justice Department has stated that it will "not engage in a
gratuitous second-guessing of business decisions." DOJ Research JV Guide-
lines, supra note 153, 13,120, at 20,658.
237. See Muris, supra note 99, at 863; Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1104; Hypo-
thetical A, supra note 120, at 1167-68 (comments by Don T. Hibner, Jr.).
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technology, may be justified by free-rider concerns. Investors
in a joint venture may also be concerned that other partners
will try to appropriate the fruits of the venture for them-
selves. 2 38 Restrictions on partners' rights to compete with the
joint venture may eliminate those concerns and encourage all
partners to contribute the resources necessary for the venture's
success.
Ancillary restraints which are farther removed from the
internal efficiency concerns of the joint venture partners will
be more suspect. Restrictions on partners' competition with
each other, for example, should be particularly difficult to sus-
tain. Limitations on the prices that partners can charge, the
territories or customers to which they can sell, or the amount
of product that they can market may not be necessary for a
joint venture to operate effectively. At the same time, these re-
strictions are likely to have a significant adverse effect upon
competition in the relevant market. The partners to a joint
venture will therefore have a heavy burden in proving that a
court should uphold the restraints as ancillary to the legitimate
purposes of a joint venture.
B. THE LEGALITY OF PARTICULAR ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
A review of the various types of competitive restrictions
that are usually implemented in connection with joint ventures
reveals how simply the courts could determine their legality
under an ancillary restraints analysis. Since the courts would
already have passed on the legality of the joint venture itself in
the first step of their analysis, 239 the only issue at the second
stage would be the relationship between the restraint and the
objectives of the joint venture. If the partners reasonably tai-
lored the restraint to meet those objectives, a court could up-
hold it on its face. If the restraint was broader than necessary,
a court would have the alternative either of striking it down
entirely or limiting it to a more reasonable scope. Under this
standard, a court could determine the legality of an ancillary
restraint without inquiring into complicated market factors.
This approach would ensure that businesses and practitioners
receive clear guidance on the appropriate breadth of ancillary
restraints as well as on the legality of joint ventures
themselves.
238. See Roberts, supra note 22, at 853; see also Rothery Storage & Van Co.
v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
239. See supra notes 150-88 and accompanying text.
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1. Information Exchanges Among Joint Venture Partners
Exchanges of sensitive technical, production, and market-
ing information between the partners and a joint venture are
often necessary for the effective operation of the venture.240
Research and development joint ventures could not operate
without the free flow of technical information between part-
ners. Production joint ventures may require data from their
partners on manufacturing methods, raw material costs, capac-
ity, and production schedules. Joint sales organizations necessi-
tate the exchange of pricing and marketing information.
In certain cases, courts have inferred that competitors have
conspired to restrain trade merely by exchanging confidential
information concerning costs, sales, production, profitability or
marketing.?4  Enforcement agencies, courts and commentators
have concluded that certain joint ventures should be prohibited
simply because of the potential for collusion from information
exchanges among partners. They have been concerned that the
partners' initial collaboration and exchange of information on
the legitimate goals of a joint venture might eventually "spill-
over" and cause the partners to collude in other markets where
they already compete.24 This view, however, confuses the le-
240. Indeed, disclosure of confidential information may contribute to the
competitive efficiency not only of the joint venture, but also its individual
partners. One of the rationales for the FTC's approval of the General Motors-
Toyota joint venture, for example, was General Motors' ability to learn
Toyota's management and manufacturing techniques. See Weinbaum, supra
note 55, at 713; Janusz A. Ordover & Carl Shapiro, The General Motors-Toyota
Joint Venture: An Economic Assessment, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1167, 1179, 1181
(1985).
241. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 643 (1980)
(credit information); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
426 (1978) (price data); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333,
334 (1969) (price data); Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 392
(1945) (production information); United States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n,
1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) t 69,878, at 77,488-89 (D. Mass. 1960) (cost information);
United States v. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 68,751,
at 73,071-72 (D. Tenn. 1957) (profit information); see also Katsh, supra note
236, at 1007 ("[S]uch data exchanges may eliminate competition or facilitate
collusion between the parties and traditionally have been suspect."); William
E. Kovacic, Illegal Agreements with Competitors, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 536
(1988) ("[A]ntitrust doctrine historically has viewed freewheeling information
exchanges among direct rivals with suspicion.").
242. See United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); DOJ International Guidelines, supra note 35,
13,109.10, at 20,601; see also Edward F. Glynn, Jr., International Joint Ven-
tures: An Enforcement Perspective, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 703, 705 (1989); Pitof-
sky, supra note 4, at 1013, 1030. For example, in Minnesota Mining the court
cited such spillover effects in prohibiting a foreign production joint venture
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gality of a joint venture itself with the appropriateness of its re-
lated restrictions on competition. Without completely
prohibiting the parties' association in a joint venture, the courts
should be able to ensure that partners exchange only that in-
formation necessary for achieving the venture's legitimate
objectives. The sharing of any information required to fulfill a
joint venture's competitive objectives should be presumptively
legal. Partners' disclosure of technical information to research
and development ventures, manufacturing information to pro-
duction joint ventures, and marketing information to joint sales
organizations should raise no antitrust issues.
Courts, however, should prohibit the exchange of confiden-
tial competitive information with uses beyond the specific
objectives of a joint venture. It would, for example, be inappro-
priate for the partners in research and development or produc-
tion joint ventures to disclose to each other pricing or
marketing information.243 In order to avoid improper ex-
changes of information, sales or marketing personnel of the
partners could legitimately be excluded from participating in
research and development or production joint ventures.2 "
Even in a joint marketing organization, exchanges of pricing in-
formation should be limited to the specific products covered by
among five domestic manufacturers of coated abrasives. 92 F. Supp. at 962.
The court concluded that cooperation among the partners in foreign markets
"may inevitably reduce their zeal for competition inter sese in the American
market." Id. at 963.
243. See McGrath, supra note 13, 1 50,470, at 56,140. Section 2(b)(1) of the
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 specifically excludes from the Act's
coverage the exchange of any information "that is not reasonably required to
conduct the research and development that is the purpose of such venture."
Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1988)). In the
General Motors-Toyota joint venture, the pricing terms in the supply agree-
ments with the partners were based on market prices for a group of similar
automobiles rather than on either party's manufacturing costs. See In re Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984). Thus it would appear that the parties
did not have access to each other's sensitive competitive information. See Ec-
cleston, supra note 170, at 1236. As a condition of approving the joint venture,
the FTC required detailed ongoing reporting requirements on the information
to be exchanged by the parties. 103 F.T.C. at 377. Similarly, the consent de-
cree in the Alcan-Arco production joint venture prohibited the parties from
exchanging information on customers, terms or conditions of sale, or market-
ing plans. United States v. Alcan Alum. Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 621 (W.D. Ky.
1985).
244. See Hypothetical B, supra note 170, at 1208 (comments by A. Paul
Victor); Brodley, supra note 20, at 1549; McGrath, supra note 1, at 975. The
Arco-Alcan consent decree required that the joint venture manufacturing
company not include marketing employees of Alcan, with which the joint ven-
ture would be competing. Alcan Alum. Ltd., 605 F. Supp. at 625.
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the venture.25
2. Restrictions on Third Parties' Access to Joint Ventures
Joint venture partners may wish to limit access to the ven-
ture in order to prevent third parties from free-riding on re-
sources which the partners have contributed. Limitations on
the number of partners or on the disclosure or licensing of joint
venture technology to third parties may be motivated by free-
rider concerns. These concerns will be particularly acute in
"risky endeavors such as research and development and innova-
tive manufacturing."' ' 6 If the fruits of a joint venture are
freely available to third parties, prospective partners will have
little incentive to contribute resources to the venture. Access
limitations allow the partners to reserve the potential benefits
of a joint venture exclusively to themselves for at least a period
of time necessary to recoup their original investment plus a
reasonable return.
Access limitations also enhance the internal efficiency of
joint ventures. Reasonable membership criteria help insure
that all partners have the financial wherewithal, technical abil-
ity and other qualifications to contribute in a meaningful way
to joint venture activities. Limitations on the number of part-
ners may keep a joint venture from becoming too unwieldy.
Membership limits may even reduce the potential anti-competi-
tive effects of joint ventures. Competitors foreclosed from par-
ticipation in a particular joint venture will be forced to form
their own cooperative arrangements or to go it alone in the rel-
evant market. In such cases, instead of a single all-inclusive
joint venture, the relevant market may include several small
ventures and individual competitors. In most cases, therefore,
membership limits and restrictions on the disclosure and licens-
ing of joint venture technology should not run afoul of the anti-
trust laws.2 4 7
245. The presence of counsel and taking of minutes at meetings among the
partners to marketing joint ventures may also help ensure that the parties do
not disclose or use sensitive competitive information for improper purposes.
See DOJ International Guidelines, supra note 35, % 13,109.10, at 20,601-02.
246. Id at 20,601.
247. The Supreme Court recognized in Northwest Wholesale Stationers,
Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 474 U.S. 284 (1985), that, unless a
joint venture possesses "exclusive access to an element essential to effective
competition," the partners should be permitted to limit access to the joint ven-
ture in a reasonable manner. Id. at 296. The Court also noted that the mere
lack of procedural due process in expelling a partner from a joint venture
should not give rise to an antitrust violation. Id at 293.
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However, when a joint venture's technology, facilities or
other attributes are so essential that firms cannot compete in
the relevant market without access to such assets, the joint
venture partners should not be allowed to preclude participa-
tion by third parties.248 In these cases, competitors' need for ac-
cess to the "essential facility" outweighs the partners' rights to
appropriate the joint venture for their exclusive use. Denial of
a competitor's access to the joint venture in these circum-
stances would have the same effect as excluding it from the rel-
evant market. Joint venture partners should therefore not be
able to limit the number of firms that can participate in an es-
sential facility or to refuse to disclose or license the technology
of these joint ventures to third parties.
Since access limitations can make joint ventures more effi-
cient as well as limit their anti-competitive potential, the courts
should be careful to compel open access only in those situations
in which it is clearly necessary. Courts should review only the
denial of third parties' access to joint ventures which, at the
time they were formed, controlled a unique technology or facil-
ity needed to compete in the relevant market. It would be un-
fair to penalize the initial risk-takers in a joint venture by
requiring them to permit access at a later date to all interested
parties simply because a joint venture had become successful.249
Open access should be required only in cases where it was clear
from a joint venture's inception that it was capable of creating
an essential facility.
Such essential facilities would include joint ventures
248. See id. at 296.
249. Such unfairness has prompted many commentators to criticize the es-
sential facility doctrine. See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAmP,
ANTITRUST LAW 656 (Supp. 1988) ("The essential facility is just an epithet
describing the monopolist's situation: he possesses something the plaintiff
wants. It is not an independent tool of analysis but only a label-a label that
beguiles some commentators and courts into pronouncing a duty to deal.");
Panel Discussion, Exclusionary Conduct, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 723, 742 (1989)
(remarks by William F. Baxter) ("Someone invested in that essential facility.
Someone got out in front when it wasn't at all clear that the facility was going
to work, and now someone else wants to come along and help themselves. The
doctrine is a very dangerous one."). Some commentators have argued that a
joint venture should not be deemed an illegal essential facility merely because
the parties possess a high collective market share. See Rule, supra note 120, at
1134 (even 80% collective market share does not require finding of essential
facility). The Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. (MCC) joint
venture for the development of a new supercomputer almost failed because
the parties feared that, if they were successful, "competitors excluded from
MCC could argue that an illegal boycott existed." Zwart, supra note 108, at 64.
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which, at their commencement, control "bottlenecks" or mo-
nopolies over essential raw materials, facilities, or technology;
industry-wide data gathering organizations; and quasi-regula-
tory agencies such as stock exchanges and standards-setting or-
ganizations.2 0 Because of the unique characteristics of these
joint ventures, prospective partners should be aware that inter-
ested parties should be allowed to participate on equal terms.251
Furthermore, investments in these joint ventures are less risky
because of their natural monopoly characteristics. As a condi-
tion of investing in the venture, prospective partners should not
require protection against free riders. The potential returns
available and the competitive necessity of participating should
be sufficient to induce firms to contribute their resources to the
joint venture. The courts, however, should allow the partners
to adopt objective, non-discriminatory membership require-
ments to protect their investments in the joint venture and in-
sure its efficient operation.252 A court should also allow the
joint venture to charge reasonable membership fees and royal-
ties for the license of technology in order to compensate the
partners for their original investment plus an appropriate
return.
253
250. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (bottle-
neck over terminal required by railroads); MCI Communications Corp. v. Am.
Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.) (control of interconnection between long
distance and local telephone service), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); see also
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (multiple
listing service for real estate); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341 (1963) (stock exchange); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (industry standards-setting organization); Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (world-wide news-gathering
service).
251. The proposed IBM-Apple joint venture will, for example, offer com-
petitors the opportunity to join the venture or to use the new computer oper-
ating system that will be developed by the venture. See Zachary & Hooper,
supra note 11, at Al; Zachary, supra note 11, at A6.
252. For example, membership criteria such as reasonable financial stand-
ing, professional accreditation, technical skill, quality levels and other condi-
tions related to members' ability to participate effectively in the joint venture
should be acceptable. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Sta-
tionery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), the Court stated that membership
rules can give a joint venture "a needed means for monitoring the
creditworthiness of its members." Id. at 296. Membership standards are often
critical to the success of a joint venture. It is, for example, important for joint
ventures among hospitals to establish quality standards (such as nurse/bed ra-
tios and the number of particular types of physicians) in order to maintain
their effectiveness. See Joseph, supra note 26, at 632.
253. National Institute on Joint Ventures, Questions and Answers to Over-
view: A Basic Foundation For Joint Venture Analysis, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 947,
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
3. Agreements by Partners Not to Compete with Joint
Ventures
Agreements by partners not to compete with a joint ven-
ture are necessary to prevent the partners from diverting the
resources of the joint venture to their own use.25 Parties will
be unwilling to invest in a joint venture if their partners can
continue to compete freely in the joint venture market.255 Par-
ticipating firms have a right to expect that all partners will
delegate to the venture the exclusive right to operate within its
scope free of interference from the partners.256 Without this
commitment, some partners may fear that others will not be
fully dedicated to supporting the joint venture.
A partner's agreement not to compete with its own joint
venture has no additional adverse effect on competition and
should be upheld as an ancillary restraint. In cases where joint
ventures facilitate entry into new markets, courts have recog-
nized that non-competition agreements have no detrimental ef-
fect on competition because, in the absence of the venture, the
parties could not have competed in the new market anyway.257
Courts should also acknowledge that non-competition agree-
ments between a joint venture and its partners do not, in and of
themselves, restrain trade among competitors in existing mar-
kets. Any such restraint of trade will result not from the non-
competition agreements, but from the joint venture itself.
Competition between a joint venture and its parents is always
948 (1985) [hereinafter Overview: Questions and Answers] (comments by
Richard W. Pogue).
254. Judge Taft recognized in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (1898), that non-competition agreements should be upheld as ancil-
lary restraints because they are made "with a view of securing [each partner's]
entire effort in the common enterprise." IHi at 280.
255. Liebeler, supra note 85, at 1028; Kovacic, supra note 31, at 1103 n.237;
DOJ International Guidelines, supra note 35, 1 13,109.85, at 20,627.
256. Indeed, a joint venture often cannot operate effectively without an ex-
clusive delegation from the partners of their rights to the portion of a business
covered by the joint venture. For example, in order to amass sufficient bar-
gaining power to operate effectively, a joint buying organization may have to
require its members to deal exclusively through it and not to engage in in-
dependent purchases of the relevant products. See Louis, supra note 22, at 904.
257. In United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963), the court upheld
an agreement by Pan Am not to compete with a joint venture for commercial
air service on the West Coast of South America. Id at 22. The court relied on
the fact that the joint venture allowed the extension of air service to a new
territory not previously served by Pan Am. Id. at 31; see also Rule, supra note
120, at 1135; Principles: Questions and Answers, supra note 217, at 1021 (com-
ments by Salem M. Katsh).
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eliminated as a result of the venture's formation. Regardless of
whether they have entered into an express non-competition
agreement, the partners to a joint venture will have a natural
inclination to avoid competing with the joint venture. Direct
competition is contrary to the partners' interests because it
reduces the profits of their own affiliate.258 When a court rules
on the legality of the joint venture itself, it must consider the
adverse effects of the natural elimination of competition be-
tween the partners and the joint venture. Once a court has de-
termined that the adverse effects are offset by the efficiencies
generated by the joint venture, it should not revisit the issue in
the second stage of its analysis. If the court has deemed the
joint venture itself proper, the court should also allow the part-
ners to secure by agreement what they can expect to occur in
the natural course: that each partner will refrain from divert-
ing business from the joint venture.2 9
4. Agreements By Partners Not To Compete With Each
Other
Direct agreements between partners not to compete with
each other can have a much greater anti-competitive effect
than can agreements by partners not to compete with their
joint ventures. Non-competition agreements between partners
and their own joint venture are vertical and by their nature are
limited to the joint venture's scope of activities. However, non-
competition agreements between joint venture partners are
258. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemi-
cal Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), that "realistically the parents would not compete
with their progeny." Id. at 168.
259. See Brodley, supra note 20, at 1554. The Department of Justice and
some courts, however, continue to believe that agreements by parties not to
compete with their joint ventures are illegal in and of themselves. See, e.g.,
DOJ Research JV Guidelines, supra note 153, I 13,120, at 20,656 ("An agree-
ment by the participants to forego independent research in competition with
the joint venture may constitute an unreasonable competitive restraint.");
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power
Co., 97 F. Supp. 952, 955-56 (D. Md. 1951) (invalidating agreement precluding
competition between parents and joint venture in electrical generation mar-
ket), aff'd, 194 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 963 (1952). Some com-
mentators have argued that agreements not to compete between a joint
venture and its parents may be valid if limited to a reasonable period, such as
the amount of time it would have taken the partners to recoup their initial in-
vestment or to develop the joint venture product independently. See Katsh,
supra note 236, at 1011; Louis, supra note 22, at 906; Principles: Questions and
Answers, supra note 217, at 1021-22 (comments by Salem M. Katsh).
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horizontal and have the potential to extend beyond a joint ven-
ture's limited scope.
If the partners limit a non-competition agreement to the
activities conducted by the joint venture, the agreement can be
upheld because it has the same effect as a covenant by the part-
ners not to compete with the joint venture. For example, the
partners' agreements not to compete with each other in devel-
oping products covered by a research and development joint
venture constitute no more than a commitment to refrain from
operating within the joint venture's scope of activities. Non-
competition agreements between partners, however, often ex-
tend beyond the scope of the joint venture to limit other areas
of commercial rivalry between the parties. These agreements
can obviate one of the most important competitive benefits of a
joint venture: the ability to integrate resources to create effi-
ciency in one portion of a market while allowing competition to
continue in another portion. The pro-competitive potential of a
research and development joint venture, for example, would be
negated if the partners agreed not to compete with each other
in manufacturing or marketing products which use the joint
venture's technology.
Non-competition agreements between joint venture part-
ners can take several different forms. The partners may agree
on a common price for selling the products developed or pro-
duced by a joint venture; they may consent to limit their sales
of such products; or they may establish exclusive territories in
which each partner can sell the products free of competition
from other partners. Each of these horizontal restraints has a
significant adverse effect on competition. Horizontal price and
output restrictions have traditionally been the primary concern
of the Sherman Act.260 Horizontal allocations of customers or
territories are just as appropriate for per se treatment.261 In
260. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court
recognized in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984), "restrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples
of restrictions of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit." Id at
107-08; see also General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d
588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984) ("An agreement on output also equates to a price-fixing
agreement... [If] firms restrict output directly, price win ... rise in order to
limit demand to the reduced supply.").
261. A horizontal agreement to allocate customers or territories "create[s]
a series of regional or local ... monopolies," General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at
594, and has therefore been deemed just as appropriate for per se treatment as
a horizontal restriction on price or output. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951) (allocation of territories among
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fact, the establishment of exclusive marketing territories
among joint venture partners may have an even greater anti-
competitive effect than an agreement by the partners to sell
products at a common price. A price-fixing agreement only
eliminates price competition among the partners. Even if they
have agreed to sell a product at a common price, the partners
can still compete with each other in non-price areas such as
customer service. The establishment of exclusive territories,
however, eliminates all competition, price and non-price, among
joint venture partners.262
Joint venture partners may attempt to justify horizontal
market division by free-rider concerns. The partners to a re-
search and development joint venture, for example, may assert
that in order to recoup their investment in the venture each
partner should be given the exclusive right to sell products in a
particular territory using the joint venture technology. Part-
ners to marketing joint ventures may argue that to encourage
partners to increase their services to customers they should
each have the exclusive right to sell the joint venture products
to certain accounts or in certain areas. However, these restric-
tions have severe anti-competitive effects and, furthermore,
they are often broader than necessary to promote the legiti-
mate objectives of the venture.263 The partners should not
affiliated companies in Europe); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068,
1072 (2d Cir. 1980) (agreement to allocate territories for dictation machines);
United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1087-90 (5th Cir.)
(competitors' agreement not to solicit others' accounts), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
903 (1978); United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806,
807 (3d Cir.) (allocation among refuse pick-up customers), cert denied, 384
U.S. 961 (1966). Several commentators have concluded that horizontal market
division is just as anti-competitive as horizontal price-fixing. See Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Re-
stricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 COLuM. L. REV. 282, 292 (1975); Peter J. Monte, Comment, Restricted Dis-
tribution After 'Schwinn'" 9 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 1032, 1040-41 (1968);
Comment, Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 HARV. L. REV. 1160, 1163 (1979).
262. See Donald L. Beschle, "What Never? Well, Hardly Ever":" Strict An-
titrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 471, 479-80 (1987).
263. In its only decisions dealing with horizontal market division among
joint venture partners, the Supreme Court found the restrictions on competi-
tion to be per se illegal. In United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967), and
United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the Court failed to find any
legitimate rationale for the establishment of exclusive sales territories for
joint venture partners. Sealy, 388 U.S. at 356-57; Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. at 611.
Some lower federal courts and commentators believe that the Supreme Court
has implicitly overruled Sealy and Topco by its recent application of the rule
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have to eliminate all competition between themselves in order
to avoid free-rider problems.264 For example, instead of abso-
lutely prohibiting its partners from selling in other partners'
territories, a joint venture may require the partners to concen-
trate their sales efforts in their own areas of primary responsi-
bility.2 65 The partners could also be required to pay a fee for
sales made outside their areas of primary responsibility. The
fee could be calculated to compensate the other partners for
the costs of investing in the joint venture or providing desired
services to customers in their own areas.
There is one circumstance in which non-competition agree-
ments among the partners to a joint venture are justified. A
non-competition agreement can have no incremental adverse
effect when the joint venture partners could not have entered
the relevant market independently.266 In Broadcast Music, Inc.
of reason to horizontal restraints incidental to joint ventures. See Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226 (1986) (Bork, J.);
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 754 F. Supp.
1336, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Rule, supra note 120, at 1123; Clanton, supra note
96, at 1245 n.30. However, the Supreme Court and the enforcement agencies
continue to cite Topco with favor. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 401 (1990); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 734 (1988); see also McGrath, supra note 13, 50,470, at 56,138. In fact, in
Palmer the Court expressly reaffirmed the per se illegality of a horizontal
market division among competitors. 111 S. Ct. at 403. In addition, some recent
lower federal court cases have also cited Topco for the per se illegality of hori-
zontal market allocation. See, e.g., United States v. Capitol Service, Inc., 568 F.
Supp. 134, 154 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985). In light of
such recent precedent, it will be difficult for joint venture partners to convince
a court that exclusive sales territories should be upheld as ancillary to a joint
venture. Indeed, one commentator has stated that the reciprocal exclusive ter-
ritories established for the marketing of the partners' competing products in
Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. Federal Trade Commision, 657 F.2d 971, 974 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982), "created an aura that the whole
deal was set up to keep Yamaha out of the United States market." Overview:
Questions and Answers, supra note 253, at 951 (comments by Robert Pitofsky).
264. Such restraints make "the mind suspicious.., of anti-competitive in-
tent," Hypothetical A, supra note 120, at 1166 (comments by Don T. Hibner,
Jr.), because there are less restrictive means of furthering a venture's
objectives.
265. See Overview: Questions and Answers, supra note 253, at 951 (com-
ments by Robert Pitofsky). The Supreme Court in United States v. Topco As-
socs., 414 U.S. 801 (1973) (per curiam), aff'g 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,485,
at 94,153 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affirmed the district court's decision which had al-
lowed areas of primary responsibility and profit pass-over clauses as less re-
strictive alternatives to the exclusive territories which the Court had
originally prohibited. 1973-1 Trade Cas. 1 74,485 at 94,154-55.
266. See Louis, supra note 22, at 892, 911-12; see also Overview: Questions
and Answers, supra note 253, at 950 (comments by Robert Pitofsky). If a non-
competition agreement is among partners in a vertical relationship, such an
[Vol. 76:1
JOINT VENTURES
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,2 6 7 for example, the mu-
sical composers' agreement to establish a common price for
their compositions did not adversely affect competition because,
in the absence of the agreement, the composers would not have
been able to license their songs at all.26 Thus, if a joint ven-
ture produces a new technology or product in a market which
the parties could not have entered but for the joint venture, in-
dividual partners should be able to limit competition between
themselves.269 Joint ventures designed to enter new markets
are inherently risky, and non-competition agreements among
agreement should also not violate the antitrust laws. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977), a manufacturer may limit competition among its distributors in order
to protect them against free-riders and encourage them to promote its prod-
ucts more effectively. Id. at 54-57. Territorial and customer restrictions im-
posed by a manufacturer on its distributors are usually valid because they
promote competition between brands and have only a minimal anti-competi-
tive effect on intrabrand competition. Indeed, the relationship between the
manufacturer and its distributors is a type of joint venture, and territorial and
customer restrictions should generally be upheld as ancillary to the venture.
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Ap-
proaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 723-27 (1991); Louis,
supra note 22, at 895. If, however, the impetus for the territorial restrictions
comes not from the manufacturer but from the distributors, the territorial re-
straints are horizontal in substance and should be deemed per se illegal as na-
ked attempts by the distributors to restrict competition among themselves.
See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 133-36 (1966) (distrib-
utors' inducement of General Motors to forbid sales by dealers to discounters);
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in
Distributor Termination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J. 311, 344-51 (1989). But see Ko-
lasky, supra note 6, at 690 (characterizing attempts to distinguish horizontal
from vertical agreements in the joint venture context as "semantic games").
267. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
268. Id at 18-23. Similarly, in Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
705 F.2d 1030 (1983), the partners to the teaming agreement for the production
of the F-18 agreed that McDonnell Douglas would be the primary contractor
for the Navy version of the jet and that Northrop would be the primary con-
tractor for the land-based version. Id at 1037. In upholding these non-compe-
tition agreements, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, but for the teaming
agreement, neither party would have been able to produce the F-18. Id at
1052-53. Thus, the court concluded that the non-competition agreements "ac-
tually foster competition by allowing both parties to compete in a market from
which they were otherwise foreclosed." Id-
269. Of course, such non-competition agreements should not extend to
other products in which the parties competed prior to the formation of the
joint venture. In Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. Federal Trade Commission, 657
F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), the Eighth Circuit appropriately distinguished exclu-
sive territorial rights for joint venture products, which might arguably have
been ancillary to the joint venture, from divisions of territories covering non-
joint venture products, which the court believed were not reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the objectives of the joint venture. Id at 981.
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individual partners can be justified by the need to encourage
prospective partners to invest in the venture. Less restrictive
alternatives such as areas of primary responsibility and fee ar-
rangements among partners may not be sufficient to induce in-
vestments in markets with such high barriers to entry.2"0
CONCLUSION
A joint venture is a unique form of business organization
that is particularly suited to the current needs of American
business. By giving firms access to the resources of their com-
petitors, joint ventures reduce barriers to entry in new markets
and encourage firms to invest in new products and technology.
Joint ventures have significant advantages over mergers as a
means of achieving economic efficiency. By virtue of their lim-
ited scope, joint ventures enhance efficiency without eliminat-
ing all competition among their partners.
In order to encourage pro-competitive alliances among
competitors, the courts need to establish clear standards for
their legality. Unfortunately, the antitrust status of joint ven-
tures has become more confused in recent years. A market-
based merger analysis, the per se rule and the uncertain stan-
dards of the rule of reason have all been deemed applicable to
joint ventures and their related restrictions on competition.
The courts' inconsistent and confusing analysis of joint yen-
270. For example, firms may not be willing to participate in a research and
development joint venture in high barrier markets without being guaranteed
an exclusive license of joint venture technology in a particular territory. See
icL; Overview: Questions and Answers, supra note 253, at 950 (comments by
Robert Pitofsky); Hypothetical A, supra note 120, at 1192-93. Partners in mar-
keting joint ventures for new products may require a guarantee of an exclu-
sive right to sell the products in a particular territory or to certain customers.
Exclusive territorial grants should, however, extend only for the period neces-
sary to assure the partners that they can recoup their original investment and
receive a reasonable return to compensate them for their up-front risks. See
Louis, supra note 22, at 906. The Department of Justice and some commenta-
tors have argued that the duration of such restrictions should be limited to the
period of time it would take a partner to independently develop and produce
the new joint venture product (the so-called "reverse engineering period").
See DOJ International Guidelines, supra note 35, 13,110, at 20,649; Katsh,
supra note 236, at 1011. Determination of such a reverse engineering period
could, however, be quite difficult "in view of the high technical complexity and
uncertainty of the concept." Brodley, supra note 177, at 346-47. The period re-
quired by the parties to recoup their original investment plus a reasonable re-
turn is easier to ascertain and is more suited to encourage investment in pro-
competitve ventures.
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tures has deterred American firms from entering into these
beneficial arrangements.
It is now appropriate for the courts to adopt a new stan-
dard that recognizes the distinctive competitive features of joint
ventures. The purpose-based analysis proposed in this Article
would simplify the courts' approach and provide clear guidance
on the acceptable scope of joint ventures and their ancillary re-
straints. This new antitrust standard would free businesses to
engage in creative joint solutions to the problems of outdated
technology, over-capacity and foreign competition.

